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APPORTIONMENT OF THE NEW YORK ASSEMBLY
RUTH C. SILVA*
TODAY, New York's assembly is rather generally conceded to be the
less popular chamber of the legislature. During New York's first
century of existence as a state, however, the assembly was considered
to be the more popular house. Indeed, the roots of representative govern-
ment in New York can be traced back to the first assembly, almost a
century before New York's existence as a state-back to January 27,
1683, when the Duke of York directed Governor Thomas Dongan to
convene an assembly of not more than eighteen representatives to be
elected by the Colony's freeholders. On September 13, the governor and
council issued writs of election, which allotted the eighteen repre-
sentatives among the different parts of the Colony. The assembly met
on October 17, divided the Colony into twelve counties, and passed the
"Charter of Libertyes," which apportioned twenty-three assemblymen
among the newly created counties.' Although the Charter was vetoed by
the King and never became operative, its reapportionment provisions
were similar to those contained in the Apportionment Act of 1691.?
While the apportionment of September 13, 1683 had been made by
executive order, the next two (1691 and 1702) were legislative apportion-
ments in the sense that they were made by an act of the assembly.
Subsequent apportionments were acts of the governor and council.
Colonial elections and apportionments occurred at quite irregular
intervals. The governor and council dissolved assemblies-usually for
one of three reasons: the demise of the Crown, the demise of the
governor, or the assembly's failure to pass financial measures. Re-
apportionment was often incidental to the election of a new assembly
following dissolution. The governor and council issued writs of election,
which proclaimed how many assemblymen were to be elected in each
of the Colony's various territorial units. In some cases, separate
representation was accorded to a manor in response to a petition or to
a borough in conformity with the borough's charter. During the colonial
period, four territorial units were used as a basis for representation.
While the county was the most general unit, separate representation
was also given to certain manors (Cortlandt, Livingston, and Rens-
selaerwyck), to the borough of Westchester, and to townships or mixed
settlements like Schenectady and its dependencies. The assignment of
more members to the more populous territorial units indicates that
Professor of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University.
1. 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of Nemv York 97-9S (1905).
2. Id. at 441-42.
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population as well as the territorial subdivision was a factor in distrib-
uting assembly seats among the various parts of the Colony. a
I. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1777, 1821, AND 1846
The constitution of 1777 set the size of the assembly at seventy and
apportioned the seventy members among the various counties.4  The
constitution also provided for a census of assembly electors to be taken
as soon as possible after the expiration of seven years following the end
of the war and directed the legislature to reapportion the assemblymen
among the counties so that the number of assemblymen would be "justly
proportioned" to the number of electors in each county.' In 1791,
following the first census, the seats were reapportioned.0 The legislature
was authorized to give an additional assemblyman to a county whenever
a septennial census showed that the number of electors in that county
had increased 1/70th part of the whole number of electors as established
by the first census. Similarly, the legislature was empowered to deprive
a county of one assemblyman if that county's electors declined 1/70th
part of the whole.7 Although the census of 1795 did not justify an
increase of more than eight members, the act of 1796 provided for
thirty-eight additional assemblymen, making a total of 108.8 In 1801,
before the return of another census, the legislature redistributed the
108 seats among the various counties.'
Later that year, a constitutional amendment altered the rules for
assembly apportionment. The original constitution had set the minimum
size of the assembly at seventy and provided for a possible increase to
three hundred members. The amendment of 1801 fixed the number of
assemblymen at one hundred, directed the legislature to apportion these
3. Id. at 97-98, 432-35; 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 137, 151
(1906).
4. N.Y. Const. art. IV (1777); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters, and other Organic Laws of the United States 1333 (2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter
cited as 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions (2d ed. 1878)].
5. N.Y. Const. art. V (1777) ; 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1333 (2d ed.
1878).
6. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1791, ch. 4.
7. N.Y. Const. art. V (1777) ; 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1333 (2d ed.
1878). Assembly electors included all freemen in the cities of New York and Albany, owners
of freeholds valued at twenty pounds or more, and tenants who paid an annual rent of at
least forty shillings. N.Y. Const. art. VII (1777) ; 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitu-
tions 1334 (2d ed. 1878).
8. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1796, ch. 19. The first census (1790) showed 57,468 assembly electors.
This number divided by 70 gave a ratio of 821. The second census (1795) showed 63,774
assembly electors. This number divided by 821 yields an assembly of 78 members. 3 Lincoln,
The Constitutional History of New York 153-54 (1906).
9. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1801, ch. 125.
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one hundred seats among the several counties, "as nearly as may be,
according to the number of their respective electors" and provided that
the number of assemblymen should be increased at the rate of two per
year until there was a total of 150 members."' In 1802, the legislature
apportioned the one hundred seats among the various counties according
to the number of electors shown by the census of 1S1.1' The fourth
census was taken in 1807 and served as the basis for a reapportionment
in 1808. Since the amendment of 1801 became operative on the first
Monday of July in 1802, six years elapsed between its adoption and the
reapportionment of 1808. Consequently, the legislature added twelve
seats-two for each year-and apportioned the 112 members among the
several counties.'2 Applying the same rule, the act of 1815 added
fourteen assemblymen, making a total of 126, and distributed the 126
among the various counties. 3
Under the amendment of 1801, another census should have been
taken in 1821 and fourteen new members should have been added,
making a total of 140. If this provision had remained in force, the
maximum of 150 assemblymen would have been reached in 1826.
Instead of directing that a census be taken in 1821, however, the
legislature provided for a convention to revise the constitution. But,
rather than merely amending the constitution, the convention of 1821
wrote a new constitution, the apportionment provisions of which differed
considerably from those found in the constitution of 1777.
Study of the first constitution, the amendment of iS01, and the six
apportionment acts passed thereunder shows that the legislature did not
divide a multi-member county into assembly districts. A county entitled
to more than one assemblyman served as one multi-member district, in
which all of the county's assemblymen were elected at large." The
legislature did, however, combine two or more counties into one single-
member or multi-member district. This constitution did not guarantee each
10. N.Y. Const. amends. I, II, IV (1301); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Cotituions
1340 (2d ed. 1878).
11. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1S02, ch. S1.
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws ISOS, ch. 90.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 115, ch. 142.
14. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 137-51 (I9 5). The fir-t draft
of the constitution of 1777 provided: "That every County within this State shall be divided
into as many Districts . . . as it (shall have] Representatives .... That every ditrict
[shall] chuse [sic] one person to represent the County . . . ." A marginal note indicate:,
however: "Agreed that the elections for representatives shall be by Counties at large as
usual .... " 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 5Ct (19C5). Although there
was a strong movement in the 1821 convention for the adoption of the single.memlacr
system, the multiple system was retained for the election of all senators and for theZe
assemblymen who represented counties entitled to more than one assembly seat. Id. at
638; 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 165-67 (1905).
19621
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
county separate representation. The convention of 1777 rejected John
Jay's motion to guarantee Richmond County at least one assemblyman
and Gouverneur Morris' motion that "'no county shall be left without at
least one representative.' "' Yet, apportionment acts passed under this
constitution gave one member to each of several counties that were
below the ratio. Moreover, the act of 1796, for example, gave one
assemblyman to Schoharie County without any census returns at all.
On the other hand, the legislature created a number of joint districts
composed of two (but never more than two) counties. The act of 1815,
for example, apportioned five seats to the joint district consisting of
Washington and Warren counties and one seat to the joint district
composed of Clinton and Franklin counties.'"
Allowing the legislature to combine counties into a joint district and
to apportion more than one member to such a district permitted enough
flexibility so that each district's assemblymen could have been made
relatively proportionate to that district's representative population. Yet,
the first six reapportionments were made without very strict adherence
to arithmetic rules. As a matter of fact, the percentage of variation
between the largest and the smallest assembly district was always far
greater than the percentage of variation between the largest and
smallest senatorial district. The greater disproportionality in assembly
representation was due largely to three factors. First, county boundary
lines were changed so frequently as new counties were created that
there were often no accurate census returns for the counties affected by
such boundary changes. While the alteration of county boundaries
usually affected counties within the same senatorial district and, con-
sequently, did not change the ratio of representation between senatorial
districts, such alterations usually affected the ratio of representation
between assembly districts. Second, the relatively larger number of
assembly districts, each of which had fewer members than did a
senatorial district, made it more difficult to maintain proportionality
between the representation of various assembly districts. Third, the
disproportionality was increased by apportioning one assemblyman to
certain counties that were below the ratio rather than combining such
counties with other counties into joint districts.
The constitution of 1821 made such disproportionality mandatory by
providing three new rules for assembly apportionment. First, by stating
15. 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 507 (1906).
16. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 157-59, 165-67 (1906). The
acts of 1808 and 1815 prescribed a procedure for canvassing the vote in such joint districts.
The clerk of the less populous county was to deliver his election returns to the more
populous county's clerk, who then proceeded with the canvass for the entire assembly district
in the usual manner. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
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that "members of the assembly shall be chosen by counties," the second
constitution at least implied that no county could be combined with
another to form a joint district. Although Hamilton was combined with
Montgomery under the apportionments of 1822, 1826, and 1836 and
with Fulton under the apportionment of 1846, every other county enjoyed
separate representation while the constitution of 1S21 was in force. This
not only deprived the legislature of its limited power to draw assembly
districts but, since district lines were inflexible, it was also more difficult
for the legislature to proportion the seats to the representative population
in each district. Second, although no new county could be created
unless its population was sufficient to entitle it to an assemblyman, every
existing county was guaranteed one assemblyman regardless of how
much its representative population might fall below the ratio.17 Third,
the size of the assembly was frozen at 128 members.' 8 This made it
impossible to give equitable representation to the most populous counties
as the total number of counties increased and as the number of counties
falling below the ratio multiplied.'
The constitution of 1821 also changed the basis of representation
from electors to "inhabitants, excluding aliens, paupers, and persons
17. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 7 (1821); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1342
(2d ed. 1878).
18. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2 (1S21); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1341 (Zd
ed. 187S).
19. Assemanr APPORTiO:zmETs UaDra CONSTITUTIO: Or 1321a
Seats apportioned 1822 1826 1836 146
To counties with less than one ratio 9 or 10b S Sor9c 7
On basis of full ratios 102 or 101b CD 101 or ICGO 102
On basis of remainders 170 20 19f 19g
Total 128 12S 128 128
Computed from statistics published in 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New
York 162-64 (1906).
b Niagara and Erie had a combined representative population of 22,833 and wvre given
one seat each. Since the ratio was 10,294, the two counties had a combined remainder of 2,250.
It is uncertain whether Niagara had a full ratio or was given a seat under the rule which
guarantees one seat to each county.
c Apportioned to the seventeen counties having the largest remainders.
d Apportioned to the twenty counties having the largest remainders.
c Chemung and Tioga had a combined representative population of 33,629 and were each
apportioned one seat. Since the ratio was 15,957, the two counties had a combined remainder
of 1,715. It is uncertain whether each county had a full ratio.
f Seventeen seats were apportioned to seventeen of the eighteen counties having the highest
remainders. The other two seats were apportioned to Chenango (remainder of 7,422) and
Columbia (remainder of 6,644) rather than to New York (leaving a remainder of 13,203
while the ratio was only 15,957) and Oneida (remainder of S,887).
9 Apportioned to the nineteen counties having the largest remainders.
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of colour, not taxed." The then present legislature was directed to ap-
portion the 128 seats among the various counties on the basis of the
federal census of 1820, but the constitution provided that a state
enumeration should be made in 1825 and every ten years thereafter. At
its first session after the return of each decennial enumeration, the
legislature had the duty of reapportioning the 128 seats among the
several counties, "as nearly as may be, according to the numbers of
their respective [representative] inhabitants."2 These constitutional
provisions for assembly apportionment remained in force with only
minor modifications until superseded by the constitution of 1894.
The constitution of 1846 expressly provided for combining Hamilton
with Fulton in a joint district until Hamilton County's representative
population became equal to the ratio, which was obtained by dividing
the State's representative population by 128. Although the third con-
stitution made single-member assembly districts mandatory, this changed
the legislature's authority in no significant way since each multi-member
county was to be divided into assembly districts by its own board of
supervisors rather than by the legislature.21 An amendment, adopted in
1874, broadened the basis of representation to "inhabitants, excluding
aliens," and transferred the power to divide New York City into assembly
districts from the New York County Board of Supervisors to the New
York City Board of Aldermen.22 The latter change simply related to
districting in New York City and, of course, did not change the rules for
apportioning assemblymen in any way.
During the seventy-two years from 1822 to 1894, eight reapportion-
ment acts were passed. On each of these occasions, a ratio was
established by dividing the State's total representative population by
128. In 1826, a joint legislative committee explained that, after ap-
portioning one member to the eight counties below the ratio, the number
of assemblymen to which every other county was entitled was determined
by dividing that county's representative population by the ratio. This
process resulted in apportioning one hundred seats on the basis of full
ratios. The committee reported that the twenty remaining seats were
assigned to the twenty counties having the largest remainders.23 This
20. N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6-7 (1821); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions
1341-42 (2d ed. 1878).
21. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5 (1846); Dougherty, Constitutional History of the State of
New York 169 (1915); 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1355 (2d ed. 1878).
The legislature's only authority in this matter was the power to prescribe the day on which
these boards of supervisors were to divide their respective counties into assembly districts.
22. 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1373-74 (2d ed. 1878).
23. Csontos, History of Legislative Apportionment in New York State 5-6 (ms. in N.Y.
State Library, 1941).
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simple arithmetic formula appears to have been used for five apportion-
ments without causing controversy.
Application of the so-called 1826 formula to the 1820 census figures
yields precisely the same distribution of seats as provided in the act of
1822.24 Similarly, application of the formula to the 1825 census statistics
produces exactly the same distribution of seats as provided in the act
of 1826.-" If adherence to this formula be the measure, two seats were
misapportioned in the act of 1836.2 Ten years later, however, the
legislature adhered strictly to the formula.2- Thus, of the 512 seats
apportioned under the second constitution, only two could be considered
as having been "malapportioned" in any sense.
The 1826 formula appears to have been used again in 1857 and,
although the act assigned an additional seat to Livingston County
(remainder of 11,625) rather than to New York County (remainder of
14,790),2s there seems to have been no controversy about the matter.
24. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1S22, ch. 207. See table and explanation c in note 19 supra.
25. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1826, ch. 289. See table and explanation d in note 19 supra.
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1836, ch. 436. See table and explanation f in note 19 supra.
27. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1846, ch. 44. See table and explanation g in note 19 supra.
28. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1857, ch. 337. See explanation b infra.
ASSEiBLy APPORTIONMiENTS U.oDER CONSrITCTEMI Or 1946a
Seats apportioned 1S57 1866 1879 1r92
To counties with less than one ratio 3 13 21 .9
On basis of full ratios 96 97 04d 921
On basis of remainders 24b 18, 130 7
Total 123 123 128 12S
a Computed from statistics published in 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of NXcr.
York 162-64 (1906).
75 Twenty-three apportioned to twenty-three of the twenty-four counties ith the largest
remainders. The other seat was apportioned to Livingston (remainder of 11,625) rather than
to New York (remainder of 14,790).
c Seventeen apportioned to seventeen of the eighteen counties with the largest remainders.
The other seat was apportioned to Ontario (remainder of 13,730) rather than to Kinrs
(remainder of 15,12S).
d Actually, ninety-seven should have been apportioned on full ratios and only ten on
remainders. The law of 1879, however, did not give Kings one seat and New York t o seats
for which they had full ratios.
0 Seven apportioned to seven of the ten counties having the largest remaindervs. The other
six were apportioned as follows: Cattaraugus (remainder of 11,626) and Niagara (remainder
of 13,546) rather than to Kings (remainder of 54,971); to Otego (remainder of 14,M39),
St. Lawrence (remainder of 9,792), and Washington (remainder of 12,229) rather than to
New York (remainder of 89,910); and to Wayne (remainder of 13,431) rather than to
Monroe (remainder of 19,206). In summary, six seats were transferred from King , Nerw
York, and Monroe to the smaller upstate counties.
f Actually, ninety-five should have been apportioned on full ratios and only four on the
basis of remainders. The law of 1892, however, denied Kings, New York, and M!onroe each
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Nine years later, however, we find a minority report criticizing the
apportionment of 1866 because an extra seat was given to Ontario, which
had a remainder of 13,730, rather than to Kings with a remainder of
15,128."2 The census of 1875 showed that twelve upstate counties should
each lose one seat in the assembly. Rather than transfer these twelve
seats to the more rapidly growing counties, the legislature simply post-
poned reapportionment. In his annual message of 1879, Governor
Lucius Robinson reminded the legislature for the fourth time that a
reapportionment should be made. He argued: "To make an unjust and
unequal apportionment . . . is . . . a very great and difficult labor. It
requires expert skill .... But to make a fair and equal apportionment
calls for nothing more than common sense, an acquaintance with the
plainest rules of arithmetic, and an honest disposition to do right."30
Although Robinson repeatedly prodded the legislature to pass a
reapportionment measure, the act of 1879 became law without his
signature. Among other things, he complained because certain less
populous counties were given more assembly seats than were given to
certain more populous counties: "I find that Cattaraugus county, with
45,737 inhabitants, has two members; while Suffolk, with 50,330, is
given but one. Orange with 82,225 inhabitants has only two members,
while St. Lawrence with only 78,014 gets three. Nor can I understand
the philosophy which gives to the latter county, with 78,000 inhabitants,
the same representation as Monroe, which exceeds it in population by
nearly fifty thousand."'"
In terms of the 1826 formula, the act of 1879 misapportioned six
seats. Actually, the legislature did not use this formula at all. The
committee divided the State's total citizen population by 128 and got
a ratio of 34,133. When the committee inspected the census returns for
each county, it found that there were twenty-two counties having less
than 34,133 citizen inhabitants. This meant that twenty-two seats had
to be distributed to these counties at the expense of the more populous
one seat, for which they had full ratios. Instead, these three seats were given to Albany,
Dutchess, and Queens on the basis of remainders.
g Three apportioned to three of the four counties with the largest remainders. The other
four seats were given to Albany (remainder of 21,025), Dutchess (remainder of 29,837),
Rensselaer (remainder of 31,197), and Queens (remainder of 33,492) rather than to Kings
(remainder of 54,645), New York (remainder of 66,754), St. Lawrence (remainder of
35,438), and Monroe (remainder of 45,507).
29. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1866, ch. 607; N.Y. Ass. Doc. No. 182 (1866) (a minority report
signed by Gideon Tucker, 0. A. Bills, and I. S. Frost). See table and explanation C In note
28 supra.
30. Csontos, History of Legislative Apportionment in New York State 7 (ms. in N.Y.
State Library, 1941).
31. Id. at 9.
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counties. The committee argued that, since twenty-two counties having
less than a full ratio were each entitled to one seat, use of this ratio
for apportioning the remaining 106 seats would operate "against the
other rural districts" and, therefore, in favor of the most populous
counties. To avoid "this discrimination," the committee recommended
distribution of the remaining 106 seats on the basis of a second ratio,
which was found by dividing the citizen population of the thirty-seven
most populous counties (3,756,818) by 106. Thus, while the constitu-
tional ratio was 34,133, the second ratio was 35,442.32
Distribution of the 106 seats to the thirty-seven most populous counties
according to the constitutional ratio would have given Kings and New
York counties each an additional seat while use of the second ratio would
have given these two seats to Otsego and Suffolk counties instead. All
other counties would have received the same number of seats on the
basis of either ratio. In making the actual apportionment, the legislature
apparently used the second ratio to give Otsego two seats instead of
one, used the constitutional ratio to give Suffolk one seat instead of two,
and seems to have followed no rule at all in the case of eight other
counties 3
Population trends in New York from 1375 to 1885 indicated that at
least a dozen upstate counties probably should each lose a seat according
to the next census. To avoid this painful ordeal, no census was taken
in 1885. When a census finally was taken in 1392, it showed that four-
teen upstate counties would each lose one seat and St. Lawrence would
32. Id. at 181-86; N.Y. Ass. Doc. No. 59 (1879). The table in note 28 supra shows
that only twenty-one counties were below the ratio while the committee found twenty-two
such counties. This discrepancy is due to the committee's using slightly different statistics
than those on which the table in note 2S is based.
33. ConmovRsiLi SF-Ts U.ND R APronRio:=.-'r or 1879
Number of scats on the basis of the
Citizen Constitutional Second Act of
County populationa ratio ratio 1379
Cattaraugus 45,771 1 1 2
Kings 464,711 14 13 12
Monroe 121,641 4 4 3
New York 909,390 27 26 24
Niagara 47,691 1 1 2
Otsego 49,034 1 2 2
St. Lawrence 7S,0S2 2 2 3
Suffolk 50,340 1 2 1
Washington 46,374 1 1 2
'Wayne 47,626 1 1 2
a 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 162-64 (1905).
b N.Y. Sess. Laws 1379, ch. 203.
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lose two if the 1826 formula were used, while thirteen would each lose a
seat if the second-ratio method were used. According to George H.
Bush, who was in charge of the 1892 bill, the original apportionment
was based on the 1826 formula but was revised to secure the votes
necessary for passage in the legislature. 4 Actually, the law of 189211
departed from the 1826 rules in the case of four seats, which were
apportioned to Albany, Dutchess, Rensselaer, and Queens rather than
to Kings, New York, St. Lawrence, and Monroe."
Critics of the act complained not only because Albany and Rensselaer
had each been given an additional seat at the expense of Monroe and
St. Lawrence but also because one of several proposed second-ratio meth-
ods had not been used. If such a method had been used, various upstate
counties such as Chautauqua could have received an additional seat at
the expense of New York and/or Kings. 7 Twenty-nine seats were
apportioned to the thirty counties having less than a constitutional ratio
(5,790,865 - 128 = 45,241). The controversy involved apportionment
of the ninety-nine other seats. If the 1826 formula, which Bush said
was used, had been strictly applied, ninety-five would have been ap-
portioned on the basis of full ratios, and four would have been ap-
portioned to the four counties having the largest remainders. If the
1879 formula had been used instead, eighty-eight would have been
apportioned on the basis of second ratios (4,831,162 --- 99 = 48,800),
and the eleven other seats would have been apportioned to the eleven
counties having the largest remainders. As a practical matter, use of
the 1879 rather than the 1826 formula would have transferred three
seats from New. York and Kings to Chautauqua, Dutchess, and Queens.
All other counties would have received the same number of seats under
either formula. Although the legislature used the 1826 formula, it did
transfer two seats from New York and Kings to Dutchess and Queens
so that only Chautauqua would have gained from the legislature's use
of the 1879 formula.18 The two seats that were transferred from Monroe
34. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1003-06 (1900).
35. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, ch. 397.
36. See table and explanations f and g in note 28 supra.
37. E.g., 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 192-204 (1906).
38. Five counties were affected by the use of two different formulae:
Number of assemblymen under
County 1826 formula 1879 formula Act of 1892
Kings 19 18 18
New York 31 29 30Queens 2 3 3
Chautauqua 1 2 1
Dutchess 1 2 2
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and St. Lawrence to Albany and Rensselaer could not be justified by
use of either formula.
In People ex rel. Carter v. Rice,O the plaintiff objected to the four
cases in which the act of 1892 deviated from the 1826 rules, that is,
Carter complained that four seats had been given to Albany, Dutchess,
Queens, and Rensselaer rather than to Kings, New York, Ionroe, [and
St. Lawrence]. In a five to two decision, the court of appeals upheld the
act on the ground that apportionment involved the exercise of legislative
discretion, which the court could not review. Although Judge Rufus W.
Peckham said that the constitution did not prescribe a method for
apportionment and, therefore, allowed the legislature to use its discretion
with respect to ratios and remainders, he proceeded to place his stamp of
approval on the 1826 or one-ratio method. He explained arithmetically
how the 1879 or two-ratio method "operates unjustly" against the most
populous counties. He added that, "by the adoption of this new, arbitrary
and unnecessary ratio, New York's representation would be reduced
from 31 to 29, and Kings from 19 to 18 .... "I" Peckham then went on
to justify the act of 1892 by saying that the legislature did not have to
apportion the remaining seats to counties with the highest remainders
since every county had been given one seat for each full ratio.," If by
"full ratio" he meant the constitutional ratio of 45,241, this statement
simply was not true. For an additional assemblyman had been denied
to Kings (remainder of 54,645), New York (66,754), and Monroe
(45,507). If by "full ratio" he meant the second ratio of 48,000, the
statement was true but the ratio was the one he had condemned.
In a separate concurring opinion, judge John C. Gray argued that
the legislature was not a mechanical contrivance for the mathematical
distribution of members of Assembly, because the phrase "as nearly as
may be" implies legislative discretion. Although he thought distribution
of remaining seats in the order of highest remainders was the best rule,
he conceded that deviations may be required by political realities. His
talk about the legislature's apportioning eleven seats on the basis of
remainders implies that he thought the legislature had used the second-
ratio method and that he approved of this method.12
judges Charles Andrews and Francis M. Finch dissented. Andrews
argued that "as nearly as may be" had been inserted because the
39. 135 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 921 (1S92).
40. Id. at 505-06, 31 N.E. at 931. Judges Robert Earl (C.J.), Denis O'Brien, and Laac
Maynard joined in Judge Peckham's opinion and in a separate concurring opinion written by
Judge John C. Gray.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 510-13, 31 N.E. at 932-33 (concurring opinion joined in by Judgs Earl,
O'Brien and Maynard).
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constitution required the preservation of county lines, which made some
inequality unavoidable. He said that "as nearly as may be" meant as
nearly as possible so that the legislature had no right to adopt rules that
made such inequality greater than was necessary. Although the 1879
formula would have made such inequality greater than the 1826 formula
did, he seemed to imply that the 1879 formula should have been used.
Accordingly, he argued that the apportionment was unconstitutional
because eleven seats had not been assigned in the order of the highest
remainders.43 The fact is that, while eleven seats were to be apportioned
on remainders if the 1879 formula had been used, only four seats should
have been apportioned on the basis of remainders if the 1826 formula
were used. In short, Carter complained because the legislature had
departed from the 1826 rules. Five judges approved the legislature's
departure from the 1879 rules while two objected to departure from
these latter rules. Thus, whichever judges reached the right decision did
so for the wrong reasons.
As the four most populous counties (New York, Kings, Erie, and
Monroe) grew more rapidly than the rest of the State, they were entitled
to gain representation at the expense of the other counties. Since the
constitution guarantees one assemblymah to each county, these four
large counties could not take their increased representation from the
small rural counties. Consequently, these four counties could gain
representation only by taking it from the upstate counties that had
previously had more than one seat in the assembly. Thus, it became a
struggle between the larger upstate counties to keep their representation
and the four largest counties to gain the representation that was
commensurate with their growth in population. Chenango and Columbia,
for example, were each accustomed to having three assemblymen. In
1836, when their population entitled them to only two, they kept their
three for another ten years at New York County's expense. Livingston,
for example, had been accustomed to two seats. In 1857, when its
population justified only one seat, it kept its two also at New York's
expense. In summary, such counties as Ontario, Cattaraugus, Niagara,
Otsego, Rensselaer, St. Lawrence, Washington, and Wayne were able
to keep their customary number of assemblymen for a decade after their
population no longer entitled them to so many. The problem was further
enhanced as the number of counties falling below the constitutional ratio
increased from seven in 1846 to twenty-one in 1879 and twenty-nine in
1892. This was the situation which began to develop in 1836 and led the
legislature to deviate from the 1826 rules in fourteen cases between
1836 and 1892.44
43. Id. at 513-21, 31 N.E. at 933-36 (dissenting opinion).
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The second-ratio method was devised in 1879 as a device to save the
representation of the intermediate size counties. Although the legislature
reverted to the one-ratio method in 1892, it did make certain "political
concessions" to these intermediate counties at the expense of New
York, Kings, and Monroe. And it was the indignation caused by these
political concessions which strengthened the hand of those who wished
to write new apportionment rules into the constitution-rules that,
strangely enough, would constitutionalize the very situation that was
the subject of complaint.
II. THE 1894 APPORTIONMNT FORMULA
While the constitutions of 1821 and 1846 divided the several counties
into two classes-those falling below the ratio and those having a citizen
population of more than one ratio-the constitution of 1894 established
a threefold classification. Specifically, section 5 of article III provides
that one assemblyman "shall be apportioned to every county, including
Fulton and Hamilton as one county, containing less than the ratio and
one-half over." Two members are to be allotted to every other county.
The remaining seats are to be divided among the counties having more
than two ratios of citizen population. Thus, for the purpose of ap-
portioning assemblymen, there are three classes of counties, which are
hereafter referred to as First, Second, and Third class counties:
First. Counties having less than 112 ratios.
44. DnP.ARur mro Ti m 1826 FOcniur.A
Gave On Rather With
Act assemblyman remainder than remainder
of to of to of
136 1. Chenango 7,422 New York 13,203*
2. Columbia 6,644 Oneida 38,57
1857 3. Livingston 11,625 New York 14,790
1S66 4. Ontario 13,730 Kings 15,123
1879 5. Cattaraugus 11,626 )Kings 54,971
6. Niagara 13,546 J
7. Otsego 14,889
8. St. Lavwrence 9,792 New York -9,910-
9. Washington 12,229
10. Wayne 13,431 Monroe 19,205
1892 11. Albany 21,025 Kings .4,C45*
12. Dutchess 29,37 Ne., York 66,7M4*
13. Queens 33,492 Monroe 45,507*
14. Rensselaer 31,197 St. Lawrence 35,433
Asterisk indicates a remainder that was greater than the constitutional ratio.
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Second. Counties having from 132 to 2 ratios.
Third. Counties having 2 or more ratios.
The constitution also prescribes the method for obtaining the ratio
and for apportioning seats on remainders. The ratio is defined as "the
quotient obtained by dividing the whole number of inhabitants of the
State, excluding aliens, by the number of members of assembly. .... WO
Since the constitution sets the size of the assembly at 150 members, 0
the ratio is determined by dividing the State's citizen population by 150.
The legislature's discretion is further limited by the provision that
"members apportioned on remainders shall be apportioned to the counties
having the highest remainders in the order thereof respectively.""7
The first step in apportioning assemblymen is to find the ratio. The
census of 1960, for example, shows a total citizen population of
16,240,786. Therefore, 1Y2 ratios equal 162,408. One assemblyman
will be given to each of the forty-four counties, with Fulton and
Hamilton considered as one county, having less than 162,408 citizen
inhabitants. Two assemblymen will then be apportioned to each of the
seventeen other counties. This will leave seventy-two seats to be
distributed among the fourteen counties having more than two ratios-
more than 216,544 citizen inhabitants. Thus, forty-four seats will be
assigned to counties of the first class, which have a total citizen popu-
lation of 2,761,656 or 62,765 citizen inhabitants per seat. Six seats
will be assigned to counties having from 1Y2 to 2 ratios, representing
93,478 citizen inhabitants per seat. The remaining one hundred will
go to the fourteen most populous counties having a total citizen
population of 12,918,265 or 129,183 citizen inhabitants per seat.48
45. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5 (1894).
46. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 2 (1894).
47. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5 (1894).
48. Statistics in the following table are based on data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 59,
pp. 32-33 (1942) ; N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 14 (1953) ; and 1960 citizen-census data supplied
by the United States Bureau of the Census. An asterisk indicates that no reapportionment
act was passed.
Average citizen population per assemblyman
in counties of
Constitutional First Second Third
Census Ratio Class Class Class
*1960 108,272 62,765 93,478 129,183
1950 94,690 57,648 87,390 112,477
1940 82,676 52,187 76,046 97,366
*1930 73,937 45,383 64,544 88,606
*1925 64,452 45,677 59,502 73,884
1915 53,730 41,424 44,660 60,998
1905 47,087 41,602 40,385 50,657
1892 38,606 36,010 32,452 40,733
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The idea of dividing counties into three groups according to popu-
lation was first introduced into the 1894 constitutional convention by
Edward Lauterbach, who proposed to give one member to every county
having less than 112 ratios, two members to all other counties, and the
remaining members to counties having three or more ratios. The Lauter-
bach proposal was similar to the plan adopted for senatorial apportion-
ment in that no county could have four or more senators unless it had a
full ratio for each senator. 9 The Committee on Legislative Organization
reported Elon R. Brown's plan, which incorporated the Lauterbach
proposal with some modifications. The original Brown plan provided for
the apportionment of one assemblyman to every county having less than
I2 ratios, the apportionment of two assemblymen to each county having
from 112 to 2 / ratios, and the distribution of all remaining members
among the other counties." The provision reported, considered in the
committee of the whole, and adopted by the convention required two
members to be apportioned to all counties having from 1,-" to 2_ _
ratios.
Elon R. Brown defended his three-class system largely by arguing
that remainders in the second-class counties were lost while those in
New York or Kings are combined to gain additional seats.5l If the
one-ratio system were applied to the thirteen second-class counties and
to the two largest counties alike, for example, the second-class counties
would have received seventeen seats and had thirteen remainders
totaling 268,573 while New York and Kings would have received fifty-
eight seats and had only two remainders equal to a mere 53,819. Such
a system, Brown argued, would mean that the counties below the ratio
would enjoy representation largely at the expense of the intermediate
counties. 2 Elihu Root contended that the three-class system did not
go far enough in giving representation to the second-class counties. He
argued that seats apportioned on remainders should not be distributed
on the basis of the largest remainders but should be given to those
49. O.1. No. 32. This plan provided for an assembly of 225 members and pr criLcd that
the ratio be established by dividing the State's citizen population by 225. 1 Revicd Rccord
of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New Yor: 37 (19O); 3 Lincoln,
The Constitutional History of New York 207 (1905). The constitution providcs: "No county
shall have four or more Senators unless it shall have a full ratio for each Senator." .Y.
Const. art- HI, § 4 (1S94). See also Silva, Apportionment of the New York Snate, S0
Fordham L. Rev. 595, 604-0S (1962).
50. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 214 (1906); 3 Revi-sed Record
of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New York 346-47 (19C0); 5 Revised
Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New York 710-12, 716-IS
(1900).
51. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1094 of the State of Nev
York 1031-32 (1900).
52. Ibid.
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counties having the largest percentage of their population unrepresented.
He said that Albany would have three seats and a remainder of 36,211
while Broome would have one seat and a remainder of 21,412. Root
contended that, in apportioning seats on remainders, Broome should be
given preference over Albany, because Broome's remainder represented
thirty-four per cent of its total population while Albany's amounted to
only twenty-three per cent of Albany's total population. 3
George H. Bush objected to this three-class system and showed
arithmetically how it would operate against the most populous counties.
He pointed out that the average population per assemblyman in the
first-class counties would be approximately 36,000, still less in the
second-class counties, but over 40,000 per member in the third-class
counties. He said that New York City would have only 23.3 per cent
of the seats in the assembly but pays forty-four per cent of the State's
taxes. He objected to the seeming contempt shown for the large cities
and argued that they were centers of wealth, intelligence, culture, and
refinement. 4
Charles Z. Lincoln took exception to Bush's statement concerning the
large cities' wealth and argued that representation should be based on
people rather than dollars. He said that the three-class system was
the "crowning feature of this scheme," because it provided for an inter-
mediate ratio and, thereby, gave increased representation to the
intermediate counties like Cattaraugus (60,000 citizen population), Chau-
tauqua (73,000), Jefferson (66,000), and Suffolk (58,872). He con-
tended that it was grossly unfair to give only one assemblyman to these
counties while also giving one to Putnam (13,000) and one to Schuyler
(16,000)." 5 While Lincoln defended the scheme on the ground that
representation should be based on population, Joseph H. Choate de-
fended the scheme by arguing that the American governmental system
was not a democracy but a republic and that population had never been
the sole basis of representation in New York. Choate contended that
the use of similar apportionment plans in other states justified the three-
class arrangement."
53. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1230-31 (1900). Root's arithmetic was in error. Actually, Albany was entitled to four
seats with a remainder of 2,324. Broome's total citizen population was 61,591. Therefore, a
remainder of 21,412 would have been closer to 35% than to 34%. Since the ratio was
.38,606, Broome's remainder was actually 22,985, which was 37% of Broome's total popula-
tion. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New York
718 (1900).
54. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1008-11, 1016-19 (1900).
55. Id. at 1046-54, 1064.
56. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 31-37 (1900). Lincoln also defended the three-class system by pointing out that
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The three-class scheme was attacked and defended on much the same
grounds used to attack and defend the plan for senatorial apportionment.
John I. Gilbert argued that the cities have "an undue preponderance in
the Legislature" and objected to allowing "a little territory in the
southern part of the State" to dominate the legislature."7 William C.
Osborn could see "no political . . . [or] commercial necessity ... " for
creating an intermediate class of counties and contended that this was
"stepping directly away from the idea that the rule of population should
govern." Osborn thought the only fair thing to do was to give each
county one member and then distribute the remaining members among
the remaining counties according to their population in mathematical
order. He argued that the whole scheme had been devised to maintain
rural dominance and to make it impossible for the Democrats to win a
majority of seats even in a popular landslide." John Al. Bowers agreed
that the scheme amounted to a three-ratio system designed to transfer
assembly seats from Democratic to Republican counties. 9 DeLancey
Nicoll also thought that the scheme was designed to insure Republican
control of the legislature for at least a half generation. He argued that
the "ingenious classification and division of counties" subordinated
population to territorial representation for the purpose of maintaining
the prestige of agricultural districts."0
In spite of these protests, the convention adopted Brown's plan for
assembly apportionment without amendment and sent it to the Committee
on Revision."' Several days later, Charles Z. Lincoln moved to recall
the measure from the committee for amendment so that it would read
as follows:
Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Missouri each used a four or five-clas nhcme. 3
Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New York 1I258
(1900). Choate's distinction between "democracy" and "republic" not only proves nothing
but is confused and inaccurate. "Democracy" is government in vhich supreme power is
retained by the people and exercised either directly (direct democracy) or indirectly (repre-
sentative democracy). 5 Encyc. Soc. Sd. 76-84 (1935). This term is used in appeltion to
"aristocracy" (in which supreme power resides in an elite) and "autocracy" (in which one
person has independent, self-derived power). 2 id. at 153-90, 321-22. A "rcpublic" is a
government in which the chief of state is directly or indirectly elected for a limited term. 13
id. at 317-21. It is to be contrasted v.ith a "monarchy," which refers to a govrnmental
system having a hereditary chief of state with life tenure. 10 id. at 579-04.
57. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New York
1074-75 (1900).
58. Id. at 1034-44.
59. Id. at 1136-37.
60. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
Yrork 1s (1900).
61. Vote of eighty-four to fifty-four. Id. at 96. The Becker amendment applied to sena-
torial but not to assembly apportionment. See Silva, Apportionment of the New York
Senate, 30 Fordbam L. Rev. 595, 607-03 (1962).
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"One Member of Assembly shall be apportioned to every county, including Fulton
and Hamilton, as one county[,] containing less than the ratio and one-half over;
two members shall be apportioned to every other county; the remaining Members
of Assembly shall be apportioned to the counties having more than two ratios[,]
according to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, in excess of two ratios."02
Immediately after reading his proposed amendment, Lincoln moved the
previous question so that the proposal was not debated. Despite protests
about the impropriety of this procedure, the amendment was passed by
a vote of ninety to fifty. 3
It will be noticed that the Lincoln amendment made two changes:
(1) Two members were to be apportioned to every county having at
least 1% ratios rather than only to those counties having from 1 Y to
2Y ratios. (2) Remaining members were to be distributed among all
counties having more than 2 ratios rather than among only those
counties having more than 22 ratios. This change meant that a county
having from 2 to 2 ratios might be able to gain a third seat on the
basis of a remainder. By a vote of fifty-three to ninety-four, the
convention defeated Benjamin S. Dean's proposal, which would have
written the 1826 rules into the constitution by assigning one assembly-
man to each county, distributing the remaining members among the
counties that have more than one ratio, and doing so on the basis of
the constitutional ratio.6 By a vote of ninety-six to sixty, the convention
then adopted the Brown-Lincoln provision in the form found in the
constitution today:
One Member of Assembly shall be apportioned to every county, including Fulton
and Hamilton as one county, containing less than the ratio and one-half over. Two
members shall be apportioned to every other county. The remaining Members of
Assembly shall be apportioned to the counties having more than two ratios according
to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens.65
Because there have been so few second-class counties, the three-class
system has never been a major cause for the growing discrepancy
between the largest counties' proportion of the State's citizen population
and their proportion of assembly seats. Not only has over-repre-
sentation of the second-class counties never cost the third-class counties
more than two or three seats, but the number of second-class counties
has declined from the high of ten in 1915 to three today. The real cause
62. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 357, 368 (1900). The parts in italics were included in Lincoln's original motion but
omitted when the secretary read it. The bracketed commas were omitted in Lincoln's
original motion but included in the secretary's version.
63. Id. at 358-76.
64. Id. at 647, 667-68.
65. Id. at 675, 694; 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the
State of New York 743 (1900).
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for the third-class counties' growing under-representation is the increased
number of counties falling below the ratio. In 1894, the first-class
counties received only two seats more than was commensurate with their
proportion of the State's citizen population, because only twenty-one
were below the ratio while fifteen had unrepresented remainders. By
1950, however, forty counties fell below the ratio while only five first-
class counties had unrepresented remainders."]
Since the constitution limits the size of the assembly to 150 members
and guarantees each county at least one seat, the counties falling below
the ratio must receive their added representation at the expense of the
third-class counties. Consequently, as the number of counties falling
below the ratio increases, the more under-represented the third-class
counties becomeY7 The most populous counties' representation can be
66. Statistics in the following table are based on data published in N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 59,
pp. 32-33 (1942); N.Y. Leg. Doec. No. 9S, p. 14 (1953); and 19 citizen-ccnsus data suppIcI
by the United States Bureau of the Census. An asterisk indicates that no reapportion-
ment act was passed.
Number of counties ha-ing assembly ratios equal to
Less From From Tv. o or
Census than one I to 1 17' to 2 more Total
*1960 38 6 3 14 bi
1950 40 5 4 12 61
1940 38 7 4 12 61
1930 37 5 S 11 61
=19 2 5 34 S 8 11 61
1915 31 8 10 12 61
1905 29 12 8 11 0
1892 21 15 9 14 59
Class First Seond Third Slate
67. Statistics in the following table are based on data published in .N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 59,
pp. 32-33 (1942); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 9S, p. 14 (1953); and 1960 dtizen-ccnsus data Eup-
plied by the United States Bureau of the Census. An asterisk indicates that no rcapportion-
ment act was passed.
Per cent of citizen population and assembly seats in counties of the
First class Second class Third clas
Census Population Seats Population Seats Population Seats
"1960 17.0 29.3 3.5 4.0 79.5 66.7
1950 18.3 30.0 4.9 5.3 76.S 64.7
1940 18.9 30.0 4.9 5.3 76.2 64.7
*1930 17.2 28.0 9.3 10.7 73.5 61.3
*1925 19.8 28.0 9.9 10.7 703 61.3
1915 20.0 26.0 11.1 13.3 6S.9 60.7
1905 24.2 27.3 9.1 10.7 66.7 62.0
1892 22.4 24.0 10.1 12.0 67.5 64.0
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made commensurate with their population only by greatly increasing
the number of assemblymen or by abolishing the guarantee of separate
representation to each of the counties below the ratio.
Abolition of the three-class system would make relatively little
difference, simply because there are so few second-class counties. The
corollary of this is that the three-class scheme does not serve its intended
purpose, because it has given relatively few extra seats to second-class
counties. Consequently, the 1938 convention proposed a new threefold
classification, which would have roughly doubled the number of second-
class counties. 68 Similarly, F. Morse Hubbard, Research Counsel to the
Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, suggested giving one
assemblyman to every county below the ratio, two to every other county,
and distributing the remainder among the counties having more than
two ratios of citizen population.69 Application of the Hubbard plan to
the 1960 census, for example, would mean thirty-three first-class, eleven
second-class, and seventeen third-class counties. Like the 1879 formula
68. The 1938 proposal would have increased the assembly from 150 to 159 members,
changed the basis of representation from citizen population to voters casting ballots at the
last gubernatorial election, and divided the counties into three classes: (1) those casting
less than 36,000 votes, (2) those casting from 36,000 to 72,000 votes, and (3) those casting
over 72,000 votes. The plan provided that one member should be apportioned to each county
in the first class, two members to all other counties, and the remaining members to counties
in the third class. New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, Doc. No. 16, at 10,
47-49 (1938). Since the ratio would be frozen at 36,000, the number of first-class counties (I.e.,
those below the ratio) would decline while the number of second and third-class counties
would increase as the population (and, therefore, the number of voters) increased.
On basis of
votes cast for Number of counties in
Governor* in First class Second class Third class
1942 42 9 10
1950 40 9 12
1958 37 10 14
* Including blank, void, and scattering. The 1938 plan directed the legislature to reappor-
tion at its first session following the 1946 elections and every twelve years thereafter. Thus,
such reapportionments would have been based on the gubernatorial vote of 1946, 1958, 1970
and every subsequent twelfth year.
If the 1938 scheme had been applied to the 1950 gubernatorial vote, for example, New York
City would have received two seats less and the remainder of the State eleven seats more
than provided in the act of 1953. Similarly, application of the 1894 rules to the 1960 dtizen-
census figures gives New York City four more seats and the remainder of the State thirteen
fewer seats than would be the case if the 1938 rules were applied to the 1958 gubernatorial
vote.
69. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, pp. 88, 74-76 (1950). Hubbard suggested freezing the ratio
at 80,000 citizen inhabitants. Therefore, as the State's population increased, the number of
first-class counties could be expected to decline while the number of second and third-class
counties would increase accordingly.
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and the present three-class system, both the 1933 and the Hubbard
plans were designed to increase the representation of such intermediate
counties as Chautauqua, Rensselaer, Schenectady, and Ulster. While
the 1938 plan would give this increased representation partially at the
expense of New York and Kings and partially by enlarging the assembly
to 159 members, the Hubbard plan would give increased representation
to both the second and third-class counties by greatly enlarging the
assembly.7" Thus, the 1938 plan would make the assembly less repre-
sentative while the Hubbard plan would make the assembly more
representative of population than is now the case.
III. APPORTIONING THE REMAINING SEATS
After one member has been assigned to each county having less than
IY2 ratios and two members have been given to every other county, the
next step is to distribute the remaining members among the counties
having more than two ratios of citizen population. Under the 1960
census, for example, there will be seventy-two seats left to be distributed
among the fourteen most populous counties. The constitution does not
spell out a formula for apportioning these remaining seats. Section 5
of article III simply says:
The remaining members of assembly shall be apportioned to the counties having
more than two ratios according to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens.
Members apportioned on remainders shall be apportioned to the counties having
the highest remainders in the order thereof respectively.
Although Charles Z. Lincoln said that this provision makes the
legislature a" 'mechanical contrivance'" for the distribution of assembly-
men and leaves little room for the exercise of legislative discretion,7 '
there has been serious controversy about the apportionment of "remain-
ing Members" to the most populous counties. In 1935, for example, no
less than eight different formulae were suggested for distributing these
remaining seats.7' Nor is selection of a formula merely an academic
70. The Hubbard plan provided for an assembly that would be three times as large as
the senate. The size of the senate would be determined by dividing the State's total citizen
population by 220,0oC. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31, p. 71 (1950). Therefore, the 19GO citizen-
census figures would produce a senate of seventy-four and an aszembly of 222 members.
Application of the Hubbard plan to the 1960 census would give 14.9% of the aszembly seats
to the thirty-three first-class counties that have 9.3% of the State's citizen population, 7.75
to the eleven second-class counties with 9.9% of the State's citizen population, and 75.2%
to the seventeen third-class counties having 83.0%o of the State's citizen population. Thus,
representation would be slightly more nearly commensurate with population than is now
the case, not because of the revised three-class system but because of the increased number
of assemblymen to be apportioned to the second and third-class counties.
71. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 213 (1905).
72. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, pp. 13-27 (1935).
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matter. Use of one formula will give Kings nineteen seats at the next
reapportionment, a second formula will give Kings only sixteen, but a
third will give Kings twenty-one seats.73 These formulae are concerned,
of course, only with apportioning the seats that remain after one seat
has been assigned to each county having less than 1 2 ratios and two
have been apportioned to all other counties. The original Brown plan
as reported by the Committee on Legislative Organization, considered
in the committee of the whole, and adopted by the convention expressly
prescribed a method for apportioning these seats:
"First. One member of assembly shall be apportioned to every county (including
Fulton and Hamilton) containing less than the ratio and one half over.
Second. Two members shall be appointed[*l to every county (including Fulton
and Hamilton) contaening [sic] such ratio and one half over, but less than twice
said ratio and one half over.
Third. The total population (excluding aliens) of the remaining counties of the
state shall be divided by the number of remaining members of assembly, and the
quotient shall be the ratio for the apportionment of said remaining members. Men;-
bers apportioned on less than the ratio shall go to the counties having the highest
remainders, in the order thereof respectively. 1 4
Thus, the text adopted on September 7th provided for two different
ratios-one to be used for apportioning seats to the first and second-
class counties and another ratio to be used for apportioning seats to
the third-class counties. On September 11, however, the convention
adopted the Lincoln amendment:
"One Member of Assembly shall be apportioned to every county, including Fulton
and Hamilton as one county, containing less than the ratio and one-half over; two
members shall be apportioned to every other county; the remaining Members of
Assembly shall be apportioned to counties having more than two ratios, according
to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens. Members apportioned on renainders
shall go to the counties having the highest remainders in the order thereof
respectively." 75
It will be noted that the Lincoln amendment made four changes with
respect to apportioning seats to second and third-class counties: (1)
Counties having from 2 to 22 ratios were moved from the second to
the third class. (2) The original ratio was to be used for apportioning
two members to third-class as well as to second-class counties. (3)
The phrase "Members apportioned on less than the ratio" was changed
to "Members apportioned on remainders." (4) The provision for a second
ratio was deleted, and members were to be distributed among the most
populous counties "according to the number of inhabitants, excluding
73. See Appendix A-1 infra.
74. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 214 (1906). (Emphasis added.)
*So in the document; probably should be "apportioned" rather than "appointed."
75. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 357, 368, 375-76 (1900). (Emphasis added.)
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aliens." In spite of this last change, Lincoln later said that his amend-
ment merely modified the method of computing the second ratio:
[T]he aggregate citizen population above two ratios is to be divided by the num-
ber of members not apportioned in the first and second groups, and the quotient will
be a new ratio. The third group is to be apportioned on this new ratio, distributing
remainders according to the rule, and the number of members thus apportioned is
to be augmented by the two already apportioned in the second group. This final
number is to constitute the completed third group, leaving in the second group the
counties having only two members. A county may have more than two full ratios;
but the excess may not be large enough to entitle it to an additional member on the
ratio for the third group. Such a county will, therefore, remain in the second group,
though, for purposes of computation, its excess has been used in apportioning the
third group.76
Lincoln went on to say that the new constitutional rules for assembly
apportionment may be stated as follows:
Divide the aggregrate citizen population of the state by 150; the quotient w;ill
be the general ratio.
First. Apportion one member to each county (including Fulton and Hamilton as
one) containing less than a ratio and a half. These will constitute the first group.
Second. Apportion two members to each county containing a ratio and a half,
or more. These will constitute the second group until modified by the third group.
Third. Ascertain the aggregate citizen population above two full ratios, and divide
this aggregate by the number of members not included in the first and second
groups; the quotient will be the ratio for the apportionment of such remaining n:cin-
bers. Apportion these members by this ratio to the counties having more than two
original ratios, using the highest final remainders in the order thereof respectively.
Add to the number of members apportioned to each county on the new ratio the
two members primarily apportioned to such counties in the second group. The
result will constitute the completed third group
7
Lincoln's quite dogmatic explanation of the procedure to be used for
distributing the third group of seats at least implies that he thought
use of a second ratio was mandatory despite the convention's adoption
of his amendment. Similarly, Senator Elon R. Brown proceeded to
advocate use of a second ratio much as though the convention had never
amended his original proposal. Brown's only concession to the Lincoln
amendment was a slight modification of his original formula for obtain-
ing the second ratio. Although the constitution says that "the quotient
obtained by dividing the whole number of inhabitants of the State,
excluding aliens, by the number of members of assembly, shall be the
ratio for apportionment ... ,,,) and although the convention specifically
adopted an amendment that deleted provision for a second ratio,"
76. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 22S-29 (1906). (Emphasis added.)
77. Id. at 229; 4 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 351 (1S05). (Empha is
added.)
78. N.Y. Const. art. II, § 5 (1894). 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention
of 1594 of the State of New York 743 (1900). (Emphasis added.)
79. By a vote of ninety to fifty. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of
1S94 of the State of New York 357, 363, 375-76 (1900).
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the legislature employed the so-called Brown formula for reapportioning
assemblymen in 1906.
The Brown Formula
The enumeration of 1905 showed a total citizen population of
7,062,988. This number divided by 150 yielded a constitutional ratio of
47,087. Thus, 1/ 2 ratios equalled 70,631. One assemblyman was given
to each of the forty-one counties (with Fulton and Hamilton combined)
having less than 70,631 citizen inhabitants. Two assemblymen were
assigned to each of the nineteen other counties. This left seventy-one
"remaining Members" to be distributed among the eleven most populous
counties. From the citizen population of each county having more than
two ratios (94,174), two ratios were deducted. The results were added.
This operation produced a sum of 3,675,222, which was then divided by
seventy-one. The quotient of 51,764 was used as a second ratio for
distributing the remaining seats. The second ratio was divided into the
citizen population of each county less two first ratios, and a number of
assemblymen equal to the resulting whole number was apportioned to,
such county. Erie's citizen population less two first ratios, for example,
equaled 344,403, which was divided by 51,764. This process gave Erie
six additional members and left a fractional surplus of 33,819. Such use
of the second ratio resulted in the distribution of sixty-five seats. The
six seats still remaining were then apportioned to the six counties that
had the largest fractional surpluses.80
80. Statistics in the following table are based on 1905 census data published in N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 59, pp. 32-33 (1942).
THE APPORTIONMENTS OF 1906 AND 1907
Members appor- Members Members
tioned on the apportioned apportioned Total
Total constitutional on second on number
citizen ratio of ratio of fractional of
County population 47,087 51,764 surpluses members
Kings 1,178,782 2 20 1 23
New York 1,800,292 2 32 1 35
Queens 179,746 2 1 1 4
Albany 163,983 2 1 - 3
Erie 438,577 2 6 1 9
Monroe 225,609 2 2 1 5
Oneida 131,393 2 - 1 3
Onondaga 169,732 2 1 - 3
Orange 101,644 2 - - 2
Rensselaer 118,732 2 - - 2
Westchester 202,650 2 2 - 4
Totals 4,711,140 22 65 6 93
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The apportionment produced by the Brown formula was incorporated
in the act of 1906.2 Of the various other formulae suggested, none
would have produced precisely the same distribution of seats-some
would have given more members to New York City while others would
have given even fewer members to it.s2 After the act of 1906 was
declared unconstitutional on grounds having nothing to do with assembly
apportionment,"3 the legislature again employed the Brown formula.
Since the same formula and the same census statistics were used, the
new laws4 distributed assemblymen precisely as they had been distributed
by the act of 1906. While defending the act of 1907 and his formula
before the court of appeals in In re Reynolds,"  Senator Elon R. Brown
admitted that the constitution did not require use of his formula:
"There is nothing in the words of the Constitution--'shall be apportioned to the
counties having more than two ratios according to the number of inhabitants' which
lays down any certain mathematical rule of computation. It is rather a direction to
apply the most equitable mathematical computation, vhatever rule may ba
developed."sG
Although use of the Brown formula may not be mandatory, there
remained the question of whether the constitution permits the use of
this or of any other second-ratio method. The court disposed of the
Reynolds case on other grounds and, consequently, did not pass on the
constitutionality of any formula for apportioning assemblymen87
Following the census of 1915, a majority of the Special Committee on
Apportionment assumed that all remaining members should be ap-
portioned on a new ratio to counties having more than two first
ratios. The question simply was which of two second-ratio methods
should be used-the Brown formula or the method employed by the
convention in 1894? The committee pointed out that the apportionment
of 1894 had been made according to the procedure in Brown's original
proposal and was never revised to conform to the Lincoln amendment.
Use of the convention's method rather than the Brown formula in 1916
would have meant the apportionment of an extra seat to New York
and Kings rather than to Oneida and Westchester. After deciding that
adoption of the Lincoln amendment precluded use of the convention's
S1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1906, ch. 431, § 2.
82. See Appendix A-7 infra.
83. In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, S1 N.E. 124 (1907). See Silva, Apportionment of the
New York Senate, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 617 n.194 (1962).
84. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1907, ch. 727, § 2.
8S. 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911).
86. Quoted from 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems
Relating to Legislative Organization and Powers 166 (193S).
87. 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911). See Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate,
30 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 617 n.195 (1962).
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method, the committee recommended use of Senator Brown's formula. 8
Although serious questions were raised about the formula's consti-
tutionality, 9 the act of 1916 incorporated the apportionment produced
by the senate majority leader's formula. 0°
The act of 1916 was declared unconstitutional in In re Dowling,0'
but Judge Emory A. Chase said: "We approve of the rule adopted by
the legislature and which has been recognized and adhered to by it since
the Constitution of 1894 in allotting the number of assemblymen to the
several counties of the state."'92 Two facts should be noted about this
judicial approval of the Brown formula. First, since the case was
decided on other grounds, Chase's approval of this formula was mere
dictum.93 , Second, Chase did not say that Brown's formula was the only
acceptable one. Ten years earlier, he had distinguished between man-
datory and discretionary provisions of the constitution relating to
senatorial apportionment and said that "this court cannot inquire into
.. . the relative merits of several plans to choose from which requires
the exercise of sound judgment and judicial [legislative?] discretion." '
Chase's two statements taken together would seem to mean that he
believed that the legislature has discretion in selecting a formula, and,
therefore, he approved the Brown formula simply because the legislature
had used it. In any event, Chase's approval of this formula would not
seem to imply judicial disapproval of all other formulae.
In 1917, Senator Brown was still the majority leader in the senate,
and his formula was employed again. Since the same formula and the
same census returns were used, the act of 1917 apportioned assemblymen
precisely as they had been apportioned by the act of 1916. 95 After the
enumeration of 1925, the Brown formula was used to draft three bills,
all of which were vetoed because the proposed senatorial districts
88. N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 46 (1916); Csontos, History of Legislative Apportionment In
New York State 192-195 (ms. in N.Y. State Library, 1941). The convention of 1894 appor-
tioned thirty-five seats to New York and four to Monroe. 5 Revised Record of the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 744 (1900). Use of the Brown
formula, on the other hand, would have resulted in apportioning five seats to Monroe and
only thirty-four to New York. Use of the Brown formula rather than the convention's
method in 1906 and 1907 again gave Monroe an extra seat at New.York County's expense.
See Appendix A-8 infra.
89. Minority Report, N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 51, pp. 2-6 (1916).
90. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1916, ch. 373, art. 8, § 121.
91. 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
92. Id. at 59, 113 N.E. at 549.
93. See Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 395, 619
n.204 (1962).
94. In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185, 198, 81 N.E. 124, 127 (1907).
95. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 798, art. 8, § 121.
[Vol. 31
APPORTIONMENT
allegedly were gerrymandered. 6 Thus, the act of 1917 was still operative
when a Democratic majority organized the legislature in 1935.
At that time, the Democrats took the position that the Brown formula
was "the Republican formula" and operated unfairly against New York
City. Although they took this position and argued that the legislature
has discretion in selecting a formula, they adopted the Brown formula
and said that they did so in order to minimize partisan differences,
facilitate passage of the bill, and because they thought the court of
appeals was more likely to approve it rather than some other formula. °7
In a radio address, Governor Herbert H. Lehman said: "I refused to
sponsor the method which would have given seventy-one Assemblymen
to the City of New York [Cullen formula] and insisted that the Repub-
lican [Brown] formula, which gives sixty-five Assemblymen, be adopted.
This is the formula under which every apportionment in recent genera-
tions has been made."s Despite, or perhaps because of, this "compro-
mise," the bill was defeated in the legislature.
Seven years later, William F. Bleakley, Counsel to the Joint Legis-
lative Committee on Reapportionment, said without further discussion:
"I have adopted the formula that has been used in past apportionments.
This formula is known as the 'Brown' formula. The formula has had
judicial approval in the Matter of Dowling. . . ."I' After quoting
Chase's dictum, Bleakley then recommended an apportionment that
resulted from applying the Brown formula to the 1940 census returns.
And, once again, the legislature passed a reapportionment act that was
based on the Brown formula." ' In upholding the constitutionality of
this law, Judge Edmund H. Lewis said:
We have considered also the criticism directed by one of the petitioners to the
reapportionment of members of the Assembly-approved at Special Term-and all
other matters to which the briefs of counsel direct our attention. Our conclusion is
that the reapportionment act of 1943 is in accord with the Constitution."°"
Thus, the court of appeals tacitly ruled that use of the Brown formula
is constitutional. It should be pointed out, however, that Judge Lewis
gave no reasons and cited no precedent for this ruling. His failure to
96. See Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 624
n.227 (1962).
97. New York State Legislature, Executive Session of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Reapportionment, March 13, 1935, pp. 19-24 (mimeographed); N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 85
(1935); 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating to
Legislative Organization and Powers 167 (1938).
98. Radio Address by Governor Lehman, April 7, 1935; see also C-ontos, itory of
Legislative Apportionment in New York State 105 (ms. in N.Y. State Library, 1941).
99. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, p. 19 (1942).
100. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 359, art. 3, § 123.
101. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 19S, 21S, 52 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1943).
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cite the Dowling case at least implies that he thought Chase's approval
of the Brown formula was mere dictum. Furthermore, Lewis did not say
that the constitution precluded the legislature's selecting a different
formula. The court simply upheld the act of 1943 and, thereby, also
held the Brown formula to be constitutional since the act of 1943 was
based on this formula.
Following the census of 1950, the Joint Legislative Committee on
Reapportionment told the Legislature:
The Constitution does not prescribe the precise formula to be used in apportioning
these additional members of Assembly. Several formulae for this apportionment
have been suggested. Only one, the Brown Formula, has ever been used. This
formula was employed by the Constitution of 1894 and in each valid reapportionment
made thereafter. Its use was approved by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Dowllng
and Matter of Fay. . . . The committee has followed that formula [in drafting the
1953 bill]. 10 2
The fact of the matter is, of course, that the Brown formula was not
"employed by the Constitution of 1894.'' Nor should it be implied
that the two invalid reapportionments-1906 and 1916-were based on
any other formula. In any event, the act of 1953 incorporated the
reapportionment produced by the committee's use of the Brown for-
mula.104 Thus, every reapportionment bill passed by the legislature
since 1894 has been based on this formula despite the 1894 convention's
adoption of a substitute for Senator Brown's second-ratio method.
The Tuttle Formula
A somewhat different second-ratio method was advocated by Messrs.
Charles H. Tuttle, Julien T. Davies, Charles A. Collin, and Frank K.
Johnston in the Reynolds case. 1 5 The so-called Tuttle formula was
the method used for the apportionment of 1894 except that, in con-
formity with the Lincoln amendment, it uses 2 rather than 2Y2 ratios
to divide the second-class from the third-class counties. That is, this
formula does not apportion two assemblymen to the third-class counties
before the second ratio is computed. Like the 1879 and 1894 formulae,
the Tuttle formula requires computation of the second ratio on the
basis of the total citizen population in all counties entitled to "remaining
Members." The Tuttle rules for assembly apportionment may be illus-
trated in terms of the 1960 census.
Divide the State's total citizen population by 150, and the quotient
will be the constitutional ratio used for apportioning seats to first and
second-class counties. The 1960 census shows a total citizen population
of 16,240,786, which yields a ratio of 108,272.
102. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 11 (1953).
103. See note 88 supra.
104. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 893, art. 8, § 123.
105. 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911).
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First, apportion one seat to all counties having less than 1 2 ratios.
On the basis of the 1960 census, this would result in assigning forty-
four seats to the forty-four counties (with Fulton and Hamilton com-
bined) that had less than 162,408 citizen inhabitants.
Second, apportion two seats to every county that has from 1 to 2
ratios but not to counties having more than two ratios. According to
the 1960 census, this would mean allotting six seats to the three counties
having from 162,408 to 216,544 citizen inhabitants.
Third, distribute the remaining seats among the remaining counties
on the basis of a second ratio, which is computed by dividing the total
citizen population of these most populous counties by the number of
seats yet to be apportioned. On the basis of the 1960 census, 100 seats
would remain to be distributed among the fourteen counties having more
than 216,544 citizen inhabitants. These counties have a total citizen
population of 12,918,265. This number divided by 100 produces a ratio
of 129,183. This new ratio is then used as a divisor of the citizen
population of each county, and the resulting whole number is the
number of assemblymen to which such county is entitled.05 In 1960,
for example, Nassau County had a citizen population of 1,275,801. This
number divided by 129,183 equals 9.88 Tuttle ratios. Therefore, Nassau
would be entitled to nine seats on the basis of full second ratios and a
tenth seat on the basis of its fractional surplus. In the fourteen counties,
ninety-five seats would be apportioned on the basis of full ratios, and
the five remaining seats would be apportioned to the five counties having
the largest fractions.'
106. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, pp. 22, 25-26 (1935).
107. The following apportionment using the Tuttle formula is based on the 1910 dtizn-
census figures supplied by the United States Bureau of the Census.
Total
Total citizen Number of assemblymen
County population Tuttle ratios with fractions
Albany 269,0S 2.03 2
Bronx 1,363,207 10.59 11
Erie 1,039,648 S.05 3
Kings 2,51S,510 19.50 20
Monroe 571,029 4.42 4
Nassau 1,275,301 9.83 10
New York 1,534,069 12.26 12
Niagara 235,677 1.82 2
Oneida 259,330 2.01 2
Onondaga 414,770 3.21 3
Queens 1,733,OS1 13.42 13
Richmond 216,764 1.63 2
Suffolk 650,112 5.03 5
Westchester 732,179 6.05 6
Totals 12,918,265 95+5 1NO
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Because the constitution guarantees two assemblymen to every
county having at least 1% first ratios, any county having less than two
full Tuttle ratios must be assigned two seats before any seats can be
apportioned on remainders. One may object that the Tuttle formula
is unconstitutional because it fails to apportion two members to the most
populous counties before the second ratio is computed. This formula
would seem to be quite as constitutional as the Brown formula is, how-
ever, if no members are apportioned on remainders until after two seats
have been apportioned to counties (such as Oneida in 1950) that have
less than two full Tuttle ratios:
The McQuade Formula
A third method involving the use of a second ratio is the so-called
McQuade formula, which has been advocated by various students of
the constitution, including Patrick H. McQuade of Albany County.
Like the Brown formula and in conformity with the Lincoln amendment,
McQuade's method uses the constitutional ratio to apportion one seat
to each county that has less than 12 ratios and two seats to all other
counties before determining the "remaining Members" to be distributed
among the most populous counties. The McQuade formula requires
these remaining seats to be allotted on the basis of a second ratio, which
is established by dividing the total citizen population of the third-class
counties by the number of seats yet to be apportioned. 108 Thus, like
the Tuttle and 1894 formulae but unlike the Brown formula, the Mc-
Quade method does not involve the subtraction of two ratios before
adding the citizen population of the third-class counties.
Under the 1960 census, for example, there would be seventy-two
''remaining Members" to be distributed among fourteen counties having
a total citizen population of 12,918,265. Dividing this number by
seventy-two yields a second ratio of 179,420, which would then be used
as a divisor of the citizen population of each of the fourteen counties
concerned. Albany, for example, has 269,088 citizen inhabitants. This
number divided by 179,420 produces a quotient of 1.5. Thus, Albany
would be apportioned one assemblyman on the second ratio, one on the
fractional surplus, and two on the constitutional ratio, making a total
of four. In the fourteen counties, sixty-six would be apportioned on
second ratios and six on remainders."0 9 It will be noticed that the Mc-
Quade formula makes it impossible for the smallest third-class county
108. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, p. 26 (1935).
109. The following apportionment using the McQuade formula is based on the 1960
citizen-census figures supplied by the United States Bureau of the Census.
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to receive less than three seats, however small the remainder over two
first ratios may be. Indeed, it is almost impossible for such a county to
receive less than four seats. This is true because every third-class
county is given two seats without subtracting two first ratios from its
citizen population. Consequently, this formula favors the least populous
third-class counties at the expense of the most populous ones."'
Tle Cullen Formula
The so-called Cullen formula was urged by former Chief Judge
Edgar M. Cullen in the Dowling case"' and is the method which the
Democratic Party has repeatedly supported as the only constitutional
method. In 1916, for example, Senators Robert F. Wagner and Thomas
H. Cullen argued that the quotient obtained by dividing the State's
citizen population by 150 is "the ratio for apportionment" and the
only ratio known to the constitution. According to the Wagner-Cullen
argument, the constitution prescribes three steps in apportioning assem-
blymen: (1) assigning one member to each first-class county; (2)
assigning two members to all other counties; and I3) apportioning the
"remaining Members" among the most populous counties on the basis
of "the highest remainders in the order thereof." Advocates of this
method argue that adoption of the Lincoln amendment precludes use of
109. (Cont'd)
Total
citizen
Members appor-
tioned on the
constitutional
County population ratio
Albany 269,08S 2
Bronx 1,368,207 2
Erie 1,039,64S 2
Kings 2,518,510 2
Monroe 571,029 2
Nassau 1,275,S01 2
New York 1,5S4,069 2
Niagara 235,677 2
Oneida 259,330 2
Onondaga 414,770 2
Queens 1,733,031 2
Richmond 216,764 2
Suffolk 650,112 2
Westchester 7S2,179 2
Totals 12,913,265 23
110. See Appendices A-1 to -S and B-I to -S infra.
111. 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
Number of
McQuade
ratios
1.50
7.63
5.79
14.04
3.13
7.11
8.3
1.31
1.45
2.31
9.66
1.21
3.62
4.36
Total m.cm-
wrs v-ith
fractions
4
10I0
16
5
9
11
3
3
4
12
3
6
6
66+6 1C3
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a second ratio and changes the meaning of "remainders.11 2 The original
Brown plan used a second ratio for apportioning "remaining Members"
and provided that any members not apportioned on the basis of the
first or second ratio should be assigned to the counties with the "highest
remainders." Members apportioned on the basis of remainders were
also described as " 'Members apportioned on less than the ratio.' "1n
Supporters of the Cullen formula argue that, under the Lincoln amend-
ment, "remainders" are the citizen population in the third-class counties
left over after deducting two ratios for the two members apportioned
to each such county in the second step. They contend, therefore, that
all "remaining Members" are to be apportioned in the order of the
highest remainders. 114
Because the number of assemblymen is frozen at 150 and because
the number of counties below the ratio has increased, the number of
ratios of citizen population in the third-class counties has become
increasingly greater than the number of assemblymen to be apportioned
to these counties. According to the 1892 census, for example, there
were ninety-six seats to apportion to the third-class counties, and these
counties had only ninety-six full ratios of citizen population-or 101.29
ratios if fractions be included."' By 1960, however, the third-class
counties had 114 full ratios-or 119.31 ratios if fractions are included--
but only 100 seats can be apportioned to these counties."10 Therefore,
it is arithmetically impossible to use the constitutional ratio as a divisor
of the citizen population of each third-class county without having the
sum of the quotients exceed the number of seats to be apportioned.
There simply are not enough seats to go around. Consequently, the
Cullen formula employs the simple process of subtracting one ratio for
every assemblyman apportioned. The Cullen procedure may be stated
as follows:
Allot assemblymen to the county having the highest remainder, subtracting one
ratio for each allotted assemblyman from the remainder of that county's citizen
population until such remainder is less than the remainder in any other county;
then allot assemblymen to such other county until its remainder in turn is less than
that of any other county, and continue this process until [all assemblymen have]
been allotted."17
On the basis of the 1960 census, for example, forty-four assemblymen
would be apportioned to the forty-four counties (with Fulton and
112. Minority Report, N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 51, pp. 2-3 (1916).
113. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 214 (1906).
114. Minority Report, N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 51, pp. 5-6 (1916).
115. See Appendix A-8 infra.
116. See Appendix A-1 infra.
117. Minority Report, N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 51, p. 3 (1916).
[Vol. 31
APPORTIONMENT
Hamilton combined) having less than 12 ratios and thirty-four would
be apportioned to the seventeen other counties. This would leave
seventy-two assemblymen to be distributed among the fourteen most
populous counties. After subtracting two ratios from the citizen popu-
lation of each of these counties, Kings would have the largest remainder.
Therefore, Kings would be apportioned the first remaining member and
one ratio would be deducted from Kings' remainder. This process would
be repeated until Kings' remainder was less than some other county's
remainder. Therefore, the first eight of these seventy-two seats would
be apportioned to Kings, leaving Kings with a remainder of 1,435,790.
Queens County's citizen population less two ratios would be 1,516,537.
Therefore, the ninth seat would be allotted to Queens, and one ratio
would be deducted, leaving Queens with a remainder of 1,40S,265. Since
Kings would have a larger remainder (1,435,790), the tenth seat would
be assigned to Kings. This process would be continued until the seventy-
second seat had been apportioned to 'Monroe County."" It will be seen
that the Cullen formula allows no county to receive a seat on a remainder
so long as there is another county having a larger remainder. In practice,
this would mean that all remaining members would have to be ap-
portioned on the basis of full ratios, and smaller third-class counties
would have no chance of receiving extra seats on the basis of fractional
surpluses.
The Four Formulae
The Cullen formula is essentially the 1826 formula adapted to the
present distribution of population. The constitutional ratio could be
used as a divisor of each county's population as long as the sum of the
whole-number quotients did not exceed the number of seats to be ap-
portioned. But, as the number of counties falling below the ratio
increased, the greater the unrepresented remainders in the third-class
counties became. Consequently, arithmetic necessity required the sub-
stitution of subtraction for division. Once this happened, the constitu-
tional ratio would no longer distribute assemblymen among the third-
class counties according to citizen population, because it allows the first
and second-class counties to receive their constitutionally guaranteed
over-representation almost wholly at the expense of the less populous
third-class counties. If the aim be to equalize the number of citizen
118. The above apportionment using the Cullen formula is based on the 19(0 citizen-
census figures supplied by the United States Bureau of the Ccnsus. For a complete and de-
tailed apportionment resulting from application of the Cullen formula to the 1915 citizen-
census figures, see N.Y. Sen. Doc. No. 51, pp. 4-5 (1916). For a complete and detailed
apportionment resulting from application of the Cullen formula to the 1930 citizen-census
figures, see 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating to
Legislative Organization and Powers 170-71 (193S).
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inhabitants per assemblyman in all of the third-class counties, the Cullen
formula has been arithmetically indefensible since the census of 1905,
and use of this formula would have produced increasingly inequitable
apportionments.
The McQuade formula would always produce inequitable apportion-
ments, not only because it gives the first and second-class counties their
constitutionally guaranteed over-representation wholly at the expense
of the most populous third-class counties but also because it gives each
of the less populous third-class counties two seats without deducting two
ratios of citizen population for these two seats. Consequently, even the
smallest third-class county can use its entire citizen population to gain a
third, and usually a fourth, seat. Thus, if the number of citizen
inhabitants per seat in the third-class counties be the measure of equity,
the McQuade formula never was and never will be arithmetically
defensible.
An inspection of Appendix A shows that the Cullen formula con-
sistently favors the more populous third-class counties while the Mc-
Quade formula consistently favors the less populous third-class counties.
Compared to these two formulae, the Tuttle and Brown formulae are
relatively neutral with respect to favoring one group of third-class
counties over another. But Appendix A also shows that the Tuttle
formula tends to favor the smaller third-class counties less than the
Brown formula does. This is true because a Tuttle ratio is always
smaller than a Brown ratio." 9 The smaller the ratio used to apportion
"remaining Members," the more seats the largest counties will receive
on the basis of full ratios and the less chance the smaller third-class
counties will have of receiving seats on the basis of fractional surpluses
or "remainders. 120
119. Statistics in the following table are based on data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc, No.
59, pp. 32-33 (1942); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 14 (1953); and 1960 citizen-census data
supplied by the United States Bureau of the Census.
Constitutional
(Cullen) Tuttle Brown McQuade
Census ratio ratio ratio ratio
1960 108,272 129,183 137,315 179,420
1950 94,690 112,477 118,324 149,455
1940 82,676 97,366 102,196 129,377
1930 73,937 88,606 93,216 116,453
1925 64,452 73,884 76,852 97,104
1915 53,730 60,998 63,601 82,848
1905 47,087 50,657 51,764 66,354
1892 38,606 40,733 41,609 57,505
120. As the size of the dividend used to find the ratio declines or as the size of the divisor
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Whether the Tuttle or the Brown formula will produce the more
equitable apportionment depends largely, but not wholly, on the distri-
bution of population among the third-class counties. On the basis of
the 1892 and 1905 enumerations, the two formulae would have produced
almost the same distribution of seats in the third-class counties."' Under
the enumerations of 1915, 1925, and 1960, the Brown formula would
have distributed "remaining MIembers" among the third-class counties
more equitably in terms of citizen inhabitants per assemblymen.'2
From 1930 to 1950, however, the Tuttle formula would have come closer
to achieving this objective than the Brown formula did.123 Given an
unknown distribution of population, it is impossible to prove whether the
Brown or Tuttle formula would produce the more equitable apportion-
ment, because neither is based on sound mathematical principles. A
mathematically ideal method of apportionment would produce an equi-
table apportionment for every conceivable distribution of population. 124
Since the constitutional formula for apportionment presumably should
be one that will produce future apportionments with equity and since
no one can predict precisely how New York's population will be dis-
tributed among the several counties in the future, it is suggested that
the formula should be one which will produce the most equitable ap-
portionment on the basis of any conceivable census returns in the years
to come.
The Wilicox Formulae
In 1825, New York's total representative population was 1,531,648,
and the size of the assembly was set at 128 members. Therefore, there
should have been one member for every 11,966 representative in-
habitants, and the apportionment to each county should theoretically
have been that county's representative population divided by 11,966.
But no county had nor was likely to have a representative population
equal to an exact multiple of 11,966. Therefore, forty-seven fractions of
used to find the ratio increases, the ratio decreases. When this smaller ratio is ueQd as the
divisor of each county's representative population, the quotients for the more populous
counties will increase faster than those for the less populous counties. In the literature on
the mathematics of apportionment, this is generally known as the "Alabama paradox" After
the census of ISSO, when the national House of Representatives was increased from 299 to
300 members, the remainders for Ilinois and Texas passed Alabama's remainder so that
Alabama would have had one less seat in a house of 3CO m~mbrs than in a houe of 299
members. Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob.
290, 292 (1952).
121. See Appendices B-S and B-7 infra.
122. See Appendices B-6, B-5, and B-1 infra.
123. See Appendices B-2, B-3, and B-4 infra.
124. For a discussion of the mathematical fallacies in ratio-type methods of apportion-
ment see Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 73-85 (1941).
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various sizes remained, and it is the determination of the weight given
to such fractions that presents the problem of an equitable apportion-
ment. If all fractions had been disregarded, only 108 assemblymen
would have been apportioned. 2 5 Moreover, this method of rejected
fractions would have favored the most populous counties, because a less
populous county's unrepresented fraction constitutes a large proportion
of such small county's total population. 120 If an assemblyman had been
given to a county for any fraction however small, 155 rather than 128
assemblymen would have been apportioned.'27 Moreover, this method
of included fractions would have favored the small counties, because it
gives a second seat, and thereby doubles representation, for any fraction
however small. Similarly, it gives a third seat, and thereby increases
representation by fifty per cent, for any fraction. But giving a twenty-
first seat to a county already entitled to twenty only increases that
county's representation by five per cent.
Therefore, the problem is not only how to apportion just the right
number of seats when the total number is fixed, 28 but also how to
equalize the relative representation of the more populous and the less
populous counties. A method like the Cullen formula, which is derived
from the principle of "rejected fractions" apportions the most possible
assemblymen to the larger counties at the expense of the smaller third-
class counties. And this inequity increases as the number of counties
below the ratio multiplies. A method like the McQuade formula, which
is a grossly distorted form of "included fractions," will give the most
seats possible to the less populous third-class counties wholly at the
expense of the more populous counties. If the aim is to hold a balance
between the more populous and the less populous third-class counties
and to equalize the number of inhabitants per assemblyman in these
125. The ratio (R) = State's total representative population divided by total number
of assemblymen (X). Seats apportioned to each county (a) = each county's representative
population divided by R; and, if fractions are dropped, M a < X (Sum of a is less than X.)
The 1938 convention's proposal would have produced a similar situation. For citizen In-
habitants, this proposal would have substituted votes cast at the last gubernatorial election.
It would also have written the Brown formula into the constitution but provided that no
county could have ten or more members unless such county had a full ratio for each
member. See note 68 supra. If the 1938 formula had been applied to the 1942 gubernatorial
election returns, for example, seven members should have been apportioned on fractional
remainders, but the ten-or-more rule made only six counties eligible. Therefore, only 158
rather than 159 assemblymen could have been apportioned.
126. Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob.
290, 291 (1952). Although Root apparently did not understand the mathematics involved,
he correctly made this point in the 1894 convention. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional
Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 1229 (1900).
127. 2 a > X (Sum of a is greater than X.) See note 125 supra.
128. 7, a = X (Sum of a equals X.)
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third-class counties, both extreme methods should be rejected in favor
of an intermediate method. That is why the Brown and Tuttle formulae
produce more equitable apportionments.
If the number of assemblymen is frozen at 128 or at 150 or at any
number, however, apportioning seats on the basis of a ratio simply is
not sound mathematically. This is especially true when a significant
number of counties falls below the ratio. All modern and mathematically
defensible methods for apportioning "remaining Members" do so accord-
ing to a system of priorities. Since the present constitution requires one
member to be assigned to each county below 1 " A ratios and two members
to be assigned to every other county, seventy-eight first and second seats
would be assigned under the 1960 citizen census. Therefore, a priority
list would start with the seventy-ninth member or the third member for
some third-class county. Each county would have a priority number
of its third member, one for its fourth member, and so on. After
computing these priority numbers, they are arranged in descending
order.'"
129. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 73-Si (1941).
130. Section of a priority list for method of major fractions based on
1960:
Total number of
assemblymen
apportioned to
all counties
79
So
81
82
83
84
85
89
97
105
112
130
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
Priority
number
1,C07,404
719,574
693,232
633,62S
559,669
547,2S3
510,320
415,859
312,872
260,045
228,412
165,90S
138,620
137,745
136,136
134,295
130,305
129,154
12S,376
126,895
County
Kings
Kings
Queens
New York
Kings
Bron.
Nassau
Erie
Westchester
Suffolk
Monroe
Onondaga
Erie
New York
Kings
Nassau
Bronx
Kings
Queens
Monroe
citizen-census of
Cumulative total
of acemblymen
for each county
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
12
19
10
11
20
14
S
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It will be noted that the first number in the table in footnote 130
is seventy-nine, because seventy-eight assemblymen have already been
assigned by the constitutional mandate concerning 1Y2 ratios. It will
also be noted that the first number in the last column is three, because
each third-class county has already been assigned two members in
conformity with the 1% ratio rule. The priority numbers in the second
column may be computed in one of several ways, each of which is
designed to give the next seat to the most under-represented third-class
county-that is, to apportion the seventy-ninth and every successive
seat "according to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens." In
1935, when Professor Walter F. Willcox of Cornell University suggested
four methods, at least two of which were mathematically sound, for
computing these priority numbers, the Counsel to the Joint Legislative
Committee on Reapportionment, William J. O'Shea, concluded that these
methods "appear to be more suited for use under the Federal Consti-
tution than under our New York Constitution."'' This conclusion
simply was a non sequitur, because each of Willcox' formulae is based
on universal mathematical principles and is not tied to any particular
constitution or set of census returns. In fact, at least two of the Willcox
formulae are well "suited for use under our New York Constitution"
since they would come closer than the Brown or Cullen or Tuttle
formula to apportioning "remaining Members . . . according to the
number of inhabitants, excluding aliens."
There are two mathematical measures of apportioning members ac-
cording to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens: (1) The average
citizen population per assemblyman, which results from dividing a
county's citizen population by the number of its assemblymen (A/a).
According to the 1960 census, for example, Albany has 269,088 citizen
inhabitants and will be given two assemblymen at the next reapportion-
ment. Therefore, Albany will have 134,544 citizen inhabitants per
assemblyman. (2) The individual citizen's share in one assemblyman,
which is obtained by dividing his county's number of assemblymen by
his county's citizen population (a/A). Since 2 -+- 269,088 -. 000,007,4,
an individual citizen of Albany will have .000,007,4 share in one assem-
blyman.'32 When the total number of assemblymen is fixed, an ap-
portionment is mathematically satisfactory (1) if the discrepancy be-
tween the number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman in any two
counties-A/a and B/b-and (2) if one citizen's share of an assembly-
man in any two counties-a/A and b/B-can not be reduced by
131. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, p. 27 (1935).
132. Scbmeckebier, The Method of Equal Proportions, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 302
(1952).
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apportioning one more assemblyman to County A and one less assembly-
man to County B or vice versa.133
Major fractions was the first method suggested by Professor Willcox
for apportioning "remaining Members . . .according to the number of
inhabitants, excluding aliens." According to this method, the priority
list is computed by dividing each third-class county's citizen population
by the arithmetic mean (or average) between succeeding assemblymen.
Since each third-class county already has been assigned two assembly-
men, its priority for a third would be computed by dividing its citizen
population by 22. For each succeeding priority number, the divisor is
increased by one. Thus, each county's priority for a fourth seat is
determined by dividing that county's citizen population by 31 .. The
divisor used for determining priorities for the fifth seat is 4 , for the
twenty-fifth seat is 24Y, and so forth. 34 This method best minimizes
the absolute differences in one citizen's share of an assemblyman in the
several counties., 3
Equal proportions, the second so-called Willcox formula, computes
the priority numbers by dividing each county's citizen population by
the geometric mean between succeeding assemblymen.' That is, County
A is entitled to another member when its citizen population divided by
the geometric mean of its present assignment of assemblymen and its
next higher assignment exceeds any other county's citizen population
divided by the geometric mean of such other county's present assign-
ment and its next higher assignment. This method best minimizes the
relative difference between any two counties' representation when meas-
ured in terms of citizen population per member and also in terms of the
individual citizen's share in an assemblyman. 3 T
The method of the harmonic mean is the third so-called Willcox
formula. A harmonic mean priority list is prepared by dividing each
county's citizen population by the harmonic mean of its next higher
133. Report of a committee of the National Academy of Sciences quoted by Schmecdlxber,
Congressional Apportionment 70 (1941).
134. Id. at 13-21. Priority (P) - county's citizen population (A . Therefore, PS -
county's present assignment + ,1
A -- 2Y, P4 = A - 3%, and so forth. See Appendix E infra.
135. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 59 (1941).
136. Id. at 21-33. The geometric mean (m) of any two numbers-a and b--is the square
root of their product. m "= /ab. Therefore, the priority number (P) would be the county's
citizen population (A) divided by the geometric mean of its present assignment (a) and its
A A A
next assignment (b). P - , P3 - __, and P4 =- ,andofort.See
Vab /2 X 3 
V./ 3 4
Appendix E infra.
137. Schmeckebier, The Method of Equal Proportions, 17 Law . Contemp. Prob. 302, 304-
05 (1952). For the algebraic proof of this proposition see Schmeckebier, supra at 305-0.
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assignment of members and its present assignment. Therefore, a county's
priority for a third assemblyman would be computed by dividing its
citizen population by the harmonic mean of 2 and 3. Similarly, its
priority for a fourth seat would be established by dividing its citizen
population by the harmonic mean of 3 and 4. This method does the best
job of minimizing the absolute differences in the number of citizen
inhabitants per assemblyman.
138
The method of greatest divisors is the fourth and last formula, which
Professor Willcox suggested to the Joint Legislative Committee on Re-
apportionment in 1935. According to this formula, the priority numbers
are determined by dividing each county's citizen population by suc-
cessive numbers of assemblymen plus one. Thus, each county's priority
for a third assemblyman would be established by dividing its citizen
population by its present number of assemblymen (2) ± 1. Four would
be the divisor used to determine priorities for a fourth assemblyman, five
would be the divisor for establishing priorities for a fifth, and so
forth.139 This method is designed to minimize the absolute difference
(or range) between the number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman
in the least under-represented and the most under-represented third-class
county. 40
The method of smallest divisors is a fifth modern method of ap-
portionment, which determines priority numbers by dividing each
county's citizen population by successive numbers of assemblymen
minus one. Thus, each county's priority for a third seat would be
computed by dividing its citizen population by the number of the next
seat (3) to be apportioned to such county less one. Therefore, two
would be the divisor used to determine priorities for a third assemblyman,
138. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 33-40, 60 (1941). The harmonic mean
of any two numbers-a and b-is twice their product divided by their sum. Thus, the
2(2 X 3) 12
harmonic mean of 2 and 3 = H = = - 2.4. Therefore, each county's priority
2+3 5
for a third seat (P3) = county's citizen population divided by 2.4. This may be expressed
A
algebraically, P = . Therefore, each county's priority for a fourth seat (P4) would
2(3 X 4) A A
be its citizen population divided by -- -- =-. See Appendix E3+4 (24 3.428,571,43
infra.
county's citizen population (A) A A
139. Id. at 49-58. P = = - so that P3 -, and so
county's next assignment (b) b 3
forth. See Appendix E infra.
140. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 82 (1941).
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three would be the divisor for establishing priorities for a fourth
assemblyman, and so forth. 4 1 Like the method of greatest divisors, the
smallest-divisor formula is designed to equalize the absolute repre-
sentation of the least under-represented and the most under-represented
third-class county, but the smallest-divisor formula uses a more com-
plicated measure of "absolute representation."
M4 2
The method of smallest divisors will often transfer one or more seats
from the more populous to the less populous third-class counties.
Application of the four Willcox formulae to any given set of census
returns, however, will almost always produce precisely the same dis-
tribution of seats. 43 Yet, even some of the Willcox formulae have a
greater tendency than do others to favor the less populous over the
more populous third-class counties. The five formulae may be arranged
from the one favoring the less populous third-class counties most to
the one favoring them least as follows:
1. Smallest divisors
2. Harmonic mean
3. Equal proportions
4. Major fractions
5. Greatest divisors.
The mathematician will see that the reason for this sequence is that the
methods are ordered from the one using the smallest divisor to the one
using the largest. The smaller the divisor, the less it will reduce each
county's early priorities (absolute quotients) and, therefore, the more
it will increase the smaller counties' chances of receiving additional seats
on early priorities. In other words, the priority number for a third seat
according to greatest divisors becomes the priority number for a fourth
seat according to smallest divisors, the priority for a fourth seat
becomes the priority for a fifth seat, and so forth. Mloreover, these
methods are arranged on the above list from the one using the divisors
county's citizen population (A) A A
141. Id.at4049.-P = =-, P3 = -, and Eo forth. See
county's present assignment (a) a 2
Appendix E infra.
142. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 40 (1941).
143. This was true of the four 'Vrollcox formulae in 1935. The apportionment according
to smallest divisors was erroneously labelled "Greatest divisors and minimum range formulae."
N.Y. Leg. Doec. No. 35 (1935) reprinted in 7 New York State Constitutional Convention
Committee, Problems Relating to Legislative Organization and Powers 173 (193); :ea
Appendices A-2, A-3, and A-4 infra. Moreover, it was one formula. Minimum range is merely
a device for testing the mathematical accuracy of any formula. In this case, the smallest-
divisor formula would actually have increased the range and, thereby, failed the test of
"minimum range." See Appendix B-1 to -S infra.
144. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 70-71 (1941).
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that increase most rapidly to the one using divisors that increase least
rapidly.14 The greater the relative increase of the divisor, the more
rapidly the priority numbers of the most populous counties will decline
and, consequently, the sooner the initial priorities of the less populous
counties will supersede the later priorities of the more populous counties.
If one measures the equity of an apportionment either by the number
of inhabitants per assemblyman or by each citizen's share in one assem-
blyman, the methods of smallest divisors and of greatest divisors should
be rejected. Each of these two methods is designed primarily to reduce
the range between the most over-represented and the most under-
represented county. The fact is, however, that either of these methods
may actually increase the range under certain circumstances. Under the
1930 census, for example, smallest divisors would have favored the
smaller third-class counties to the point that it actually would have
increased the range from 14,053 to 14,488 citizen inhabitants per
assemblyman. Under different circumstances, the method of greatest
divisors would favor the larger counties to the point that its use would
also increase the range. Thus, neither method can meet its objectives
under every circumstance. This leaves three methods from which to
choose: harmonic mean, major fractions, and equal proportions. Because
the harmonic mean and equal proportions favor the smaller third-class
counties more and because the still smaller first and second-class counties
are already over-represented-indeed, thirty-eight of them are now
below the ratio-major fractions theoretically will come the closest to
equalizing the number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman in the
half dozen most populous counties with the number of citizen inhabitants
per assemblyman in all other counties. As a practical matter, however,
major fractions and equal proportions are likely to produce exactly the
same distribution of seats.
With only two exceptions, the application of major fractions and
equal proportions to each of the eight sets of citizen-census returns from
1892 to 1960 would produce precisely the same distribution of assem-
blymen. In the two exceptional cases, equal proportions would give the
assemblyman to the less populous county-to Weschester rather than to
New York County in 1940 and to Nassau rather than to New York in
1925.14 Mathematicians will see that this difference is due to the fact
that major fractions uses the arithmetic mean while equal proportions
uses the geometric mean.1 In 1940, major fractions would have done a
145. See Appendix E infra.
146. See Appendix A-1 to -8 infra.
147. Willcox, Last Words on the Apportionment Problem, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob.
290, 294, 296, 298 (1952). Therefore, major fractions adopts an unchanging critical fraction
of .500 while equal proportions adopts a changing one lying between .414 and .500. See
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better job of reducing the absolute difference in the number of in-
habitants per assemblyman in the most and least under-represented third-
class counties, 4 s but equal proportions would have reduced the range
more than major fractions would have done in 1925.1°1
Algebraically, the harmonic mean can only be proved to meet one test
of equitable apportionment-to minimize the differences in the number
of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman. Similarly, major fractions can
only be proved to meet one test-to minimize the differences in each
citizen's share of one assemblyman. Since there is algebraic proof that
equal proportions meets both tests, this method is mathematically
superior to the other two. This superiority over major fractions is
highly theoretical, however, since both methods will almost always
produce the same apportionment in practice.' '
Practical considerations would suggest that major fractions should
be selected in preference to equal proportions, because the ordinary
citizen will be able to understand the former method. He will be able
to see the reasonableness of determining his county's priority for another
assemblyman by dividing his county's population by a number midway
between his county's present number of assemblymen and the number
of assemblymen his county would have if one more were apportioned.
Any average high school student can be shown why 2' _ is a proper
divisor for establishing priorities for a third seat, why 3' 2 is proper for
the fourth seat, and so forth. He need understand neither geometric nor
harmonic means. In short, only a knowledge of elementary arithmetic
is necessary to understand major fractions while a knowledge of algebra
is necessary to understand equal proportions. Therefore, major fractions
appears to be preferable to equal proportions on the very practical
ground that the average citizen will understand the fairness of the former
while only mathematics professors are likely to be convinced of the
equity of the latter.
Either formula can only reduce the inequities among the third-class
counties. Neither major fractions nor equal proportions can really
distribute assemblymen among all of the counties according to citizen
population if the assembly remains frozen at 150 members while a
significant number of counties is below the ratio.
Appendix E infra. This explains why equal proportions gives the seat to the smaller county
on the rare occasions when the two methods do not yield precisely the same distribution of
seats, because the critical fraction increases as the number of seats apportioned to a county
increases.
148. See Appendix B-3 infra.
149. See Appendix B-5 infra.
150. See Appendix A-1 to -S infra.
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IV. SIZE OF THE ASSEMBLY
In 1821, when only nine or ten counties were under the ratio, the
assembly was frozen at 128 members. When the convention of 1846
met, the total number of counties had risen from fifty-two (with Hamil-
ton and Montgomery combined as one county) to fifty-eight (with
Hamilton and Fulton combined), but the number of counties below the
ratio had declined to seven. Therefore, although the State's citizen
population had almost doubled, 5' the assembly was held at 128 mem-
bers.'52 By 1867, there was only one new county (Schuyler), but the
number below the ratio had risen to thirteen. Therefore, the convention's
Committee on Legislative Organization proposed to enlarge the assembly
to 139 members to reduce the inequality caused by apportioning so
many seats to counties below the ratio,0 3 but this proposal was defeated
at the polls. Although the number of counties falling below the ratio
increased to twenty-one according to the enumeration of 1875, the 1872
Commission did not recommend an increase in the number of assembly-
men. 4 Thus, when the convention met in 1894, the assembly still had
128 members.
The convention's Committee on Legislative Organization:
[D]eemed it advisable to increase the number . . . of Assemblymen from 128 to
150 in order to effectuate a more complete representation of the whole people of the
State. The present number [128] . . . was fixed by the Constitution of 1821, when
the population of the State was 1,372,812. The total citizen population of the State
is, under the census of 1892, nearly five times greater. .... rr
Elon R. Brown and others defended the increased number of assembly-
151. From 1,317,632 in 1820 to 2,399,548 in 1845. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History
of New York 164 (1906).
152. There was, however, some sentiment for enlarging the assembly. Moses Taggart of
Genesee, for example, suggested an assembly of 136; Samuel Richmond, also of Genesee,
proposed 144; Henry C. Murphey of Kings suggested 148. By a vote of thirty-five to
seventy, the convention rejected the motion of Richard P. Marvin of Chautauqua that
would have empowered the legislature to enlarge the assembly to 150 members after the
1855 enumeration. 2 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 129 (1906). Genesee
lost two assemblymen, and Chautauqua lost one in 1846. 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional
History of New York 165 (1906).
153. Others suggested enlarging the assembly to 141, 142, 143, or 145 members. Milton
Merwin, a member of the Committee on Legislative Organization, presented a minority report
proposing an assembly with a possible membership of 250. By a vote of fifty-two to sixty-
two, the convention rejected a motion to fix the assembly at 160 members. 3 Lincoln, The
Constitutional History of New York 319-20, 432 (1906).
154. There was considerable sentiment, however, for enlarging the assembly. The com-
mittee on the legislature proposed 256 members. 2 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of
New York 487-90 (1906).
155. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 711 (1900).
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men on much the same grounds by arguing that the State's increased
population required a larger assembly.100 Tracey C. Becker said that
this was a "just and fair increase in the number" of assemblymen
designed "to bring them up to the great increase in the population of
the whole State. . . .MU William Sullivan argued that this line of
reasoning should logically lead to a five-fold increase-to an assembly
of 640 members. Sullivan contended that a growth in population requires
an increase in the ratio rather than in the number of assemblymen." s
Equitable apportionment required enlarging the assembly, not because
the population had grown, but because: (1 the number of counties
had risen from fifty-two to fifty-nine; (2) the number of counties
falling below the ratio had increased to twenty-nine; and (3) each of
these twenty-nine counties was constitutionally entitled to an assembly-
man. Before 182 1, assemblymen could be apportioned more nearly
according to population, because two or more counties could be com-
bined into one assembly district, to which an appropriate number of
members could be apportioned. The constitution of 1821 guaranteed
separate representation to each county and, thereby, made greater
disparities between population and representation inevitable. Yet,
assemblymen could still be apportioned without serious disparities while
only a few counties were below the ratio. In 1892, however, almost a
quarter of all assemblymen had to be apportioned to counties having
less than one ratio of representative inhabitants. In short, the assembly
was too small, because the growth in population had not been uniform
throughout the State. Therefore, apportioning assemblymen according
to population could only be accomplished in one of three ways: (1) re-
ducing the number of counties; (2) abolishing the guarantee of one
member to each county; or (3) enlarging the assembly. The 1894
convention's Committee on Legislative Organization correctly pointed
out:
The principal difficult, in reaching absolute equality arises ... from regarding the
count, lines as controlling. But with 150 Members of Assembly ... the inequalities
are not considerable, except in the few [21] cases arising under the provision of the
Constitution which provides that every county, no matter what its population, shall
have a Member of Assembly. Your committee has not deemed it wise to attempt
to change this rule, which has been so long established .... 13
Since it was not deemed feasible to reduce the number of counties
156. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1.94 of the State of New
York 1029-30 (1900).
157. Id. at 999, 1002.
158. Id. at 1103.
159. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of 'ew
York 710 (1900); see also the comments of Elihu Root, 3 Revised Record of the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1S94 of the State of New York 1211 (1900).
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or to abolish the county rule, enlarging the assembly was the only
alternative to increasingly inequitable apportionments. George H. Bush
and John M. Bowers favored an assembly of 160 members.00 Henry J.
Cookinham proposed an assembly of 200 members,10 1 which would have
left only eight counties below the ratio. Edward Lauterback suggested
225 assemblymen,162 which would have left only Putnam, Schuyler, and
Yates below the ratio. Charles Z. Lincoln and Joseph H. Choate
advocated enlarging the assembly to 150 so that some second-class
counties' representation could be increased from 1/128th to 1/75th.Y"1
John H. Peck was disturbed because the second and third-class counties
would gain this additional representation at the expense of rural counties,
whose representation would be reduced from 2/128ths to 2/150ths or
from 1/128th to 1/150th.Y64 Benjamin S. Dean also objected to this
reduction in the rural counties' representation and predicted that future
population growth would occur in these rural areas so that fewer
counties would be below the ratio. 5 Consequently, he moved to hold
the assembly to 128 members. After defeating Dean's motion,100 the
convention adopted the Brown-Davies plan for an assembly of 150
members.
In 1894, an assembly of 150 meant that two-thirds of the counties
were above the ratio. Today, however, it means that almost two-thirds
are below the ratio. 67 Thus, there is now more reason for enlarging
the assembly than there was in 1894. The greater the number of counties
below the ratio, the more under-represented the third-class counties
must be if the number of assemblymen remains fixed at 150. If each
county below the ratio is to enjoy separate representation, the most
obvious way to approach an apportionment "as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens"
would be to enlarge the assembly enough to give each third-class county
one seat for each full constitutional ratio and for every major fraction
160. Id. at 1081, 1132-36.
161. 0.1. No. 48, 1 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the
State of New York 40 (1900); 0.1. No. 103, 1 Revised Record of the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1894 of the State of New York at 137.
162. 0.1. No. 32, 1 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the
State of New York at 37.
163. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1056-57 (1900); 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the
State of New York 35 (1900) ; see also "Address to the People." Id. at 1254.
164. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 1069-73 (1900).
165. Id. at 1155-57.
166. By a vote of ninety-four to fifty-three. 4 Revised Record of the Constitutional
Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 646, 667-68 (1900).
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thereof. If this kind of a change were adopted, the size of the assembly
would fluctuate according to the number of counties below the ratio and
according to the number of major fractions in the third-class counties."S
Even with these additional seats, the third-class counties would still
be substantially under-represented in relation to the many counties
below the ratio. Parity in representation can be achieved only by
enlarging the assembly and, consequently, enlarging the divisor used to
find the ratio.
If the assembly were set at 200 members, thirty-three counties would
still be under the ratio according to the 1960 citizen census. Even with
an assembly of 300 members, twenty-three counties would continue to
be below the ratio although the ratio would be reduced to only 54,136.
On the basis of the 1960 citizen census, 1,085 assemblymen would be
required to get a ratio small enough to bring Schuyler County above
the ratio. So large an assembly would be undesirable, of course, for a
number of obvious reasons. Thus, the problem is to create an assembly
that is small enough to be a working legislative body and yet large
enough to permit a reasonably equitable apportionment.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
If the number of counties below the ratio does not increase by more
than a few and if major fractions or equal proportions rather than the
167. The number of counties below the ratio according to the census of 1892 - 21, of
1905 = 29, of 1915 = 31, of 1925 = 34, of 1930 = 37, of 1940 = 3S, of 1950 = 40, and of
1960 = 3S.
16S. The second, third, and fourth columns in the following table exclude all first-class
and second-class counties but include all third-class counties. The last column includcs all
of the State's counties.
Total number Additional seats
of con- Total number of nece sary to give Toial
stitutional assemblymen one for each ratio size ox
Census ratios apportioned and major fraction ac Qmbly
1960 119.31 10 19 169
1950 115.21 97 is 163
1940 114.23 97 17 167
1930 110.26 92 is 163
1925 105.47 92 15 165
1915 103-30 91 12 162
1905 100.03 93 7 157
1S92 101.29 96 S 155
Except for the two additional seats given on major fractions in 1925, these third-class
counties would not have received more than was commensurate with their number of con-
stitutional ratios.
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Brown formula were used, an assembly of 200 members would permit
relatively equitable apportionments."'9
Plan One
If the total number of assemblymen is to be fixed, a modern and
mathematically sound apportionment method such as major fractions
will actually apportion assemblymen more nearly "according to the
number of inhabitants" or according to the number of voters than will
any ratio-type method yet devised. Therefore, one way of making .the
assembly more representative would be the adoption of a constitutional
provision similar to the following:
The Assembly shall always consist of two hundred members. One Assemblyman
shall be apportioned to every county, including Fulton and Hamilton as one county.
The remaining Assemblymen shall be apportioned to the several counties, including
Fulton and Hamilton as one county, in the order of priority determined by the
formula of major fractions. The priority list shall be determined by dividing each
county's total [citizen] population'7o by the arithmetic mean of the last seat
apportioned to said county and the next seat to be apportioned to said county. No
county shall hereafter be erected unless it shall contain at least one-half of one per
cent (1/200th) of the State's total [citizen] population.171
Adoption of such an apportionment method would be no revolutionary
innovation. The major fractions method was used to apportion congress-
men among the states after the census of 1910 and again after the census
of 1930 while equal proportions was employed in the 1941, 1951, and
1961 congressional reapportionments. 72 Moreover, at least three states
169. Proposals for enlarging the assembly to 200 have often been introduced In the
legislature. See, e.g., 2 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Amendments
Proposed to the New York Constitution 1895-1937, at 121 (1938).
170. Since the ratio of citizens to aliens is now approximately the same in every county,
it makes relatively little difference whether the popular base be total or citizen population.
Silva, Legislative Representation With Special Reference to New York, 27 Law & Contemp.
Prob. -' - n.22 (1962). For the italicized words "citizen population," the words "number
of votes cast for assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may be substituted. The
reason for using votes rather than population as the popular base for apportionment Is that
nonvoters do not bear a uniform relation to total population in every county. Therefore, If
the aim is to equalize the weight of one popular vote cast for assemblyman in any county
with the weight of one popular vote cast for assemblyman in any other county, number
of votes rather than population must be used as the apportionment base. Id. at - n.24. The
reason for using the number of votes cast for assemblyman at the last two elections Is that
voter participation in presidential years does not increase over that in gubernatorial years
at a uniform rate throughout the State. Id. at - n.27.
171. The last sentence would be necessary to prevent the legislature from increasing the
number of counties below the ratio. See also note 170 supra.
172. No congressional reapportionment was made after the census of 1920. Following
the census of 1940, a Democratic Congress replaced major fractions by equal proportions,
largely because the latter method gave the 435th Congressman to Democratic Arkansas
rather than to Republican or doubtful Michigan.
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have used equal proportions to distribute their respective legislators
among the several counties. The constitutions of both Alaska and
Hawaii require use of equal proportions for distributing members of
the lower house.1 1 3 The Arkansas Board of Apportionment has employed
the equal proportions method on several occasions, and the Arkansas
Supreme Court found the apportionment which resulted from use of
this method to be remarkably accurate. 7 Not only are these modern
apportionment methods remarkably accurate, but incorporation of such
a method into the New York Constitution would mean both greater
clarity and at least 170 fewer words in the second and fifth sections of
article IIlY
Plan Two
Yet, if the number of counties falling below the ratio increases, an
assembly of 200 will become too small to permit an equitable apportion-
ment just as an assembly of 128 members became too small in 1894 and
just as an assembly of 150 is now too small to permit an equitable
apportionment. Consequently, a second and, perhaps, better alternative
would be an assembly, whose size would adjust automatically according to
the number of counties below the ratio. If the number of such counties
increased, the assembly would automatically be enlarged, but if the
number of such counties declined, the number of assemblymen would
also decline. Therefore, a second alternative would be the adoption of
a constitutional amendment similar to the following:
The ratio for apportioning Assemblymen shall always be determined by diiding the
State's total [citizen] population by two hundred. One Assemblyman shall be appor-
tioned to every county, including Fulton and Hamilton as one county, below the
ratio. Every other county, including Fulton and Hamilton as one county, shall be
apportioned one Assemblyman for each full ratio of [citizcn] population and for a
major fraction thereof. No county shall hereafter be erected unless it shall contain
at least one-half of one per cent (1/200th) of the State's total [citizcn] pop:dation.170
Adoption of this proposal would reduce the verbiage in the second
and fifth sections of article III by approximately 200 words. 77 Although
this proposal would reduce the classes of counties from three to two-
those below and those above the ratio-it would not change the present
guarantee of one assemblyman to every county below IT.' ratios. Nor
173. Alaska Const. art. VI, § 4 (1959); Alaska Legislative Council, Legisative DiMstricting
and Apportionment in Alaska, (Staff Memo. No. 8) 13 (1956); Hawaii Corst. art. 1I, § 4
(1959).
174. Shaw v. Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941); Sears, Methods of Rcappor-
tionment 25-26 (1952).
175. This proposal contains 109 words which would replace ten words in § 2 and 275
words in the farst two paragraphs of § S.
176. See note 170 supra.
177. This proposal contains eighty-nine words. See note 175 supra.
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would it alter the present rule which guarantees two assemblymen to
every county having from 12 to 2 ratios, because they would continue
to receive a second seat for the major fraction. It would simply mean
that the additional assemblymen would be given to the largest counties,
whose representation is not now commensurate with their citizen popu-
lation. It would also mean that one ratio-the constitutional ratio-
would be used for apportioning assemblymen. Thus, adoption of this
simple formula would eliminate controversy about second ratios and
would adapt the 1826 formula to modern conditions and modify it to
conform to sound mathematical theory.'"
If for 200, a larger divisor is substituted, the ratio will become smaller
and, consequently, the fewer the counties below the ratio, the larger the
size of the assembly, the more assemblymen to be apportioned to counties
above the ratio, and the smaller the difference between the number of
citizen inhabitants per assemblyman in the smallest and the largest
counties. If for 200, a smaller divisor is substituted, the more counties
below the ratio, the fewer the number of assemblymen to be apportioned
to the largest counties, and the greater the disproportion between the
representation of the largest and the smallest counties. Although a larger
divisor would allow for a more representative assembly, it could lead to
an assembly of unwieldy size.
If a divisor of 200 were used, the assembly would attain its theoretical
maximum size of 260 members only in the inconceivable event that
more than 99.75 per cent of the State's representative population lived
in one county while less than .25 per cent lived in all the other counties.
The number of assemblymen would decline to the theoretical minimum
of 170 in the equally unlikely event that no county fell below the ratio
and that every county had an unrepresented minor fraction of .49999+.
In fact, adoption of this formula is likely to mean an assembly of some
210 or 215 members. 79
While a divisor of 200 does not make representation reflect the number
of citizen inhabitants perfectly, it does come close to equalizing the
representation of the smallest, the intermediate, and the largest coun-
178. The mathematical objections to apportioning by use of a ratio do not apply to this
proposal, because the size of the assembly is not set. See Willcox, Last Words on the Ap-
portionment Problem, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 290, 291 (1952); Schmeckebier, Congres-
sional Apportionment 78-79 (1941).
179. Application of this formula to the citizen-census figures for 1960 would produco
an assembly of 215 members; for 1950 = 213; for 1940 = 211; for 1930 = 210; for 1925 =
206; for 1915 = 205; for 1905 = 199; and for 1892 = 202. See Appendix D-3 infra. As
Schmeckebier correctly points out, the number of assemblymen may decline as the State's
population increases if a proportionate part of this increase occurs in the less populous
counties so that the number of counties below the ratio declines. Schmeckebier, Congres-
sional Apportionment 74 (1941).
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ties.' Therefore, adoption of this proposal would also reduce the
differences between the number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman
in the smallest, the intermediate, and the largest counties.lsl After
inspecting the table in footnote 181, one may object that the one-seat
counties are still over-represented in relation to the other counties. This
is inevitable with an assembly of only 200-odd members. The only
solution to this problem would be further enlargement of the assembly
or abolition of the guarantee of one assemblyman to every county.
Certainly, however, one thing can be said of this proposal for an
assembly of 200-plus-or-minus members. Its adoption would give the
third-class counties representation that is more nearly commensurate
with their citizen population.'
Neither Plan One nor Plan Two would make representation perfectly
ISO. The percentage of citizen population and the perccntage of assembly sats appor-
tioned to counties entitled to one, two, and three-or-more assembilymen would have Leen:
One seat Two seats Three or more seats
Census Population Seats Population Seats Population S~ats
1960 13.51 1S.60 5.66 5.5 F0.S3 7502
1950 14.50 19.25 4.81 4.69 E0.69 7b C
1940 15.16 19.43 6.07 5.69 7S.77 74.S3
1930 15.54 19.05 7.12 6.67 77.34 742
1925 15.52 17.96 10.2S 9.71 74.20 72.33
1915 15.64 16.53 14.16 13.66 70.10 69.76
1905 16.31 16.53 15.19 15.0, 6.0 63.34
1892 12.73 11.SS 17.17 13.3I 70.10 69.31
S11. The number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman in the entire State, and in the
counties entitled to one, two, and three-or-more assemblymen would have en:
Three-or-
All One-seat Two-seat morc-seat
Census counties counties counties counties
1960 75,539 54,859 76,546 30,539
1950 66,6S3 50,236 63,236 70,746
1940 5S,774 45,S56 62,632 61,19
1930 52,812 43,035 56,378 54,9M6
1925 46,931 40,543 49,706 40,143
1915 39,315 37,075 40,761 39,564
1905 35,492 35,973 35,761 35,317
1S92 28,663 30,713 26,161 23,996
182. The percentage of citizen population and the percentage of assemblymen in all
third-class counties as defined in the present constitution would have been:
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reflect the number of inhabitants (or voters) 183 in each county, and the
one-seat counties would continue to have more assemblymen than is
commensurate with the size of their popular base. This is inevitable,
however, if the assembly is to have only 200-odd members. The only
solution to this problem is further enlargement of the assembly or
abolition of the rule that guarantees at least one assemblyman to each
county. Plans One and Two are so explicit that adoption of either would
make apportionment a ministerial function, which permits no discretion.
Either would make the apportioner "a mechanical contrivance for the
mathematical distribution of members of assembly."' 8 Therefore, if
the duty of apportioning assemblymen were vested in an executive
officer such as the secretary of state, the courts could compel the ap-
portionment of assemblymen by mandamus. 8 Such automatic ap-
portionment is desirable, not only because it is so precise that it would
avoid logrolling and controversy but also because it would prevent the
kind of stalemate which occurred after the enumeration of 1925.180
Moreover, adoption of either formula would make the following constitu-
tional provision superfluous: "No county shall have more members of
Assembly than a county having a greater number of inhabitants, ex-
cluding aliens."' 87 The kind of apportionment that this sentence was
designed to prevent simply could not occur under either Plan One or
Plan Two.
Plan Threo
If the rule guaranteeing at least one assemblyman to each county were
abolished, then a smaller assembly could reflect the popular base with
182. (Cont'd)
Assemblymen
Present Proposed
Census Population formula formula
1960 79.5 66.7 74.4
1950 76.8 64.7 71,8
1940 76.2 64.7 72.0
1930 73.5 61.3 70.0
1925 70.3 61.3 68.0
1915 68.9 60.7 68.3
1905 66.7 62.0 66.8
1892 67.5 64.0 66.3
183. See note 170 supra.
184. People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473, 512, 31 N.E. 921, 933 (1892) (concurring
opinion) ; see also 3 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 218 (1906).
185. Silva, The Legal Aspects of Reapportionment and Redistricting: Baker v. Carr, 30
Fordham L. Rev. 581, 593 n.73 and accompanying text (1962).
186. Id. at 593 n.75.
187. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5 (1894).
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equal accuracy. Therefore, a third alternative might well be a provision
similar to the following:
The Assembly shall always consist of [one hundred fifty] members. The ratio for
apportioning Assemblymen shall always be determined by dividing the State's total
[citizen] population'8s by [one hundred fifty]. Each county having one or more full
ratios shall be apportioned one Assemblyman for each full ratio or a major fraction
thereof .'" The remaining counties shall be combined into assembly districts so
that each district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of [citizcn]
inhabitants"10
Plan Four
If a fixed ratio for apportioning assemblymen is preferred, a variation
of Plan Three is suggested as a fourth alternative similar to the follow-
ing:
The ratio for apportioning Assemblymen shall always be one hundred thousand
[citizen] inlabitants.191 Each county having one or more full ratios shall be appor-
tioned one Assemblyman for each full ratio or a major fraction thcreof.Y3 2 The
remaining counties shall be combined into assembly districts so that each district
shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number o.f [citizen] inhabitants.103
Allowing the districting agency to combine several counties into one
joint district would permit apportionment according to population (or
voters) and would do so with an assembly of less than two hundred
members. Moreover, adoption of such a plan would not be a complete
innovation in New York. Before 1821, the legislature not only combined
several counties into one joint assembly district but also apportioned
more than one assemblyman to some of these joint districts. This
permitted enough flexibility so that each district's number of assembly-
men could be proportioned to the size of that district's popular base.
Although multi-member assembly districts were used until 1846, the
constitution of 1821 made disproportionality mandatory by abolishing
the joint district and by guaranteeing at least one assemblyman to every
county while freezing the size of the assembly at 128 members.1 ' 4
Thus, adoption of Plan Three or Four would be a partial return to New
York's first constitution.
ISS. "[NLumber of votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may be
substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra.
1s9. "[Alnd an additional Assemblyman for a surplus [citizen] population [or votes]
exceeding three-fifths of a ratio" may be substituted for the italicized words. Sea Silva, Ap-
portionment of the New York Senate, 30 Fordam L. Rev. 595, 642 n.294 and accompanying
-text (1962).
190. "[Nlumber of votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may
-be substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra.
191. "[Elighty-five thousand votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elec-
tions" may be substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra.
192. See note 159 supra.
193. "[Nqumber of votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may
33e substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra.
194. See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text.
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Plan Five
Plans Three and Four are both premised on the assumption that
county lines are to be respected in apportioning assemblymen and in
drawing the boundaries of assembly districts. If county lines were not
to be controlling in the drawing of assembly districts, however, then a
fifth alternative might well be the adoption of a constitutional provision
similar to the following:
Each senatorial district shall be divided into three [or two or four] assembly
districts, each of which shall elect one Assemblyman. Each assembly district shall
be composed of contiguous territory and shall be as compact as practicable. No
assembly district shall contain a number of [citizen] inhabitants that is [three] per
cent greater or [three] per cent less than the average number of [citizen] inhabitants
in all assembly districts in the same senatorial district.' 05
While adoption of Plan Five would permit a smaller assembly, it would,
of course, create some serious districting problems.' 0
Districting under Plan One or Two or Three or Four or Five
The fact is that any of the first five plans suggested for assembly
representation would present districting problems, and no one of them
should be adopted without also adopting appropriate districting rules to
prevent-or at least restrict-gerrymandering. If Plan One or Two
were adopted, the local authority might well continue to draw the
boundaries of assembly districts in counties entitled to more than one
assemblyman. In this case and in the absence of a thorough districting
study, a provision similar to the following is tentatively suggested:
The [local body] in each county entitled to two or more Assemblymen shall meet
on the day designated by [the state apportionment agency] and divide the county
into a number of assembly districts equal to the number of Assemblymen to which
that county is entitled. Each district shall be composed of contiguous territory
and shall be as compact as practicable. No district shall contain a number of
[citizen] inhabitants that is [three] per cent greater or [three] per cent less than the
average number of [citizen] inhabitants in all assembly districts in the same county.10 7
This districting provision would have the merit of limiting gerry-
195. "[N]umber of votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may
be substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra.
196. For a discussion of the distinction between apportionment and districting, see
Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 595-97 (1962).
Districting problems are beyond the scope of this article. For a summary discussion of
districting problems, see Silva, Legislative Representation With Special Reference to New
York, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. , (1962). For a number of excellent
suggestions for a new approach to districting rules and for objective criteria to be used In
measuring the equity of a districting plan, see Reock, Procedures and Standards for the
Apportionment of State Legislatures (unpublished doctoral thesis, Rutgers State University,
1959).
197. "i[Number of votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may
be substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra.
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mandering while allowing the local body to conform to local custom and
convenience by using wards or election districts or health districts or
census tracts rather than towns and blocks.19s
If Plan Three or Plan Four or Plan Five were adopted, assembly
district boundaries would have to be drawn by an agency having state-
wide authority. Such a districting agency might well be subject to the
same limitations suggested for the local authority:
Each assembly district shall be composed of contiguous territory and shall be as
compact as practicable. No district shall contain a nmnbcr of [citizen] in!abitants
that is [three] per cent greater or [three] per cent less than the average numtbcr of
[citizen] inizabitants in all assembly districts in the same county [or in the same
senatorial district]. 109
Plan Six
If both county lines and the single-member districts were to be
abolished for purposes of assembly representation, not only could the
assembly be smaller but all assembly districting problems could be
solved by adoption of a sixth alternative. All of the fifth section of
article III could be replaced by a simple twelve-word sentence: "One
Senator and three [or two] Assemblymen shall be elected in each sena-
torial district." Prior to 1955, each of Illinois' senatorial districts served
as a three-member representative district, in which three members of
the Illinois House of Representatives were elected at large.' Since
Illinois uses a proportionate electoral system for electing members of
the lower house, at least three representatives had to be elected in each
district. If such an electoral system were used, the number should be
limited to three in order to prevent a splintering of the two major
parties 01 If a single-ballot system were used, however, only two
assemblymen should be elected in each senatorial district in order to
minimize the disproportionality between each party's share of the state-
wide vote and its share of assemblymen.
2 2
198. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 53, pp. 9-10 (1945). See also 1 Silva, Legislative Apportionment,
State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision and Simplification of the Conti-
tution Staff Report No. 33, pp. 1-26 to 1-29 (1960).
199. "[Njumber of votes cast for Assemblymen at the last two regular elections" may
be substituted for the italicized words. See note 170 supra. If Plan Five were adopted,
"in the same senatorial district" should be substituted for "in the same county."
200. Ill. Const. art. IV, §§ 7-3 (1S70). The 1954 amendment provides for fifty-eight
senatorial and fifty-nine representative districts so that the two districts are no longer
congruent. But this amendment readopted the three-member reprczentative district and the
cumulative vote. Ill. Const. amend, art. IV, §§ 6-7 (1954); see also Juergensmeyer &
Sokolow, The Campaign for the Illinois Reapportionment Amendment (1957).
201. 2 Silva, Legislative Apportionment, State of New, York Temporary Commi-con
on Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, Staff Report No. 33, pp. S-56 to S-58
(1960).
202. Id. at S-1S, S-56.
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Plan Seven
A final alternative is identical to the fifth plan suggested for senatorial
representation 0 3 This seventh alternative provides for the apportion-
ment of one assemblyman to each of the sixty-two counties and for
weighting of each assemblyman's vote in the assembly according to the
population in his county or according to the number of popular votes
cast in his county at the last two regular assembly elections. If each
assemblyman's vote were weighted on the basis of population, the
assemblyman from the least populous county would have one vote.
Therefore, Hamilton's assemblyman would have one vote in the assembly.
Every other assemblyman's vote would be weighted by dividing the
population of that assemblyman's county by the population of Hamilton
County. Since New York County's 1960 population was 398 times that
of Hamilton, for example, New York County's assemblyman would be
entitled to cast 398 votes in the assembly.04
Similarly, an assemblyman's vote could be weighted according to the
number of popular votes cast in his county at the last two regular
elections. The fewest popular votes cast in any one county at the 1958
and 1960 assembly elections were cast in Hamilton County. While only
5,301 popular votes were cast for assemblyman at these two elections in
Hamilton County, 1,029,876 were cast in Nassau County. Therefore,
Hamilton's assemblyman would be entitled to one vote in the assembly
while Nassau's would be entitled to 194 votes.2 5 One objection to this
particular weighting system is that high electoral participation by the
minority party's supporters in a county would simply enhance the other
party's strength in the assembly. This, of course, would encourage the
minority party in any given county to abstain from voting in assembly
elections.
Therefore, a better system might be to reduce the number of assem-
blymen from 150 to 124, give one assemblyman to each of the two major
parties in each of the State's sixty-two counties, and weight each assem-
blyman's vote in the assembly according to the number of popular votes
cast for his party's candidate in his county at the last two assembly
elections. The fewest popular votes cast for a major party's assembly
candidates in any one county at the last two elections were cast for the
203. Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 647-50
(1962).
204. Computed from 1960 census data published in U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census
of Population: 1960, Vol. I, pt. A, 34-3 (1961).
205. 1,029,876 divided by 5,301 equals 194. Election figures were supplied by the New
York Secretary of State since the Legislative Manual does not distinguish between votes cast
in Hamilton and in Fulton counties. For an explanation of the reason for using the number
of votes cast at the last two regular elections, see note 170 supra.
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Democratic candidates in Hamilton County. Since Hamilton's Demo-
cratic candidates polled 1,535 votes while the Republican candidate
polled 3,766, Hamilton's Democratic assemblyman would have one vote
in the assembly while Hamilton's Republican assemblyman would have
2Y2 votes in the assembly. -"I Similarly, Nassau's Democratic assembly-
man would have 280 votes20 7 while Nassau's Republican assemblyman
would have 386 votes in the assembly.os While various other weighting
systems have been suggested, they have not been discussed here, not only
because they are a great deal more complicated but also because they
require use of a proportional or semi-proportional electoral system. 2
Whatever arguments can be advanced in favor of weighting a senator's
vote according to the population or to the number of votes in his county,
can also be advanced in favor of weighting an assemblyman's vote
according to the number of inhabitants or votes in that assemblyman's
county: weighting provides what amounts to automatic reapportionment;
it is arithmetically simple; it provides equitable representation with
mathematical precision; and so forth.21 Plan Seven might well be
coupled with any one of the first four plans suggested for senatorial
representation'1" but should not be combined with the fifth one." ' If
each senator's vote in the senate and each assemblyman's vote in the
assembly were weighted according to either the population or the number
of votes cast in his county, the two houses would be molded in the image
of each other, and the purpose of bicameralism would be vitiated.
Without the adoption of a constitutional amendment that either
weights the assemblyman's vote or enlarges the assembly or abolishes
the guarantee of separate representation to every county, little can be
done to make the apportionment of assemblymen more equitable. In
the absence of such a constitutional amendment in 1963, about all that
can be done will be to shuffle one assembly seat each from Mlonroe
and Onondaga to Bronx and Kings counties."'a
206. 3,766 divided by 1,535 equals 2T. See note 205 supra.
207. 429,794 divided by 1,535 equals 2S0. See note 205 supra.
203. 592,997 divided by 1,535 equals 3S6. See note 205 supra.
209. See Engle, Weighting Legislators' Votes to Equalize Reprezentation, 12 Western
Pol. Q. 442 (1959).
210. Silva, Apportionment of the New York Senate, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 643-60
(1962).
211. Id. at 640-47.
212. Id. at 647-50. The selection of a plan for assembly representation should depznd
at least partially on the plan used for senatorial representation and %ice vera. While Plan
Six is compatible with the first four plans suggested for senatorial reprezentation lid. at
640-47), it is not compatible with the fifth one. Id. at 647-50. Plan Six is probably Lest
suited for use with the third one. Id. at 643-44.
213. See Appendix A-1 infra.
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APPENDIX A-i
CENSUS OF 1960
All counties Number Number of assembly seats under various formulae
having of Major
more than two constitu- fractions
constitutional tional Using second ratio or Equal
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 12.64 11 11 10 10 11
Kings 23.26 21 20 19 16 20
New York 14.63 13 12 12 11 12
Queens 16.01 14 13 13 12 13
Richmond 2.00 2 2 2 3 2
Albany 2.49 2 2 2 4 2
Erie 9.60 8 8 8 8 8
Monroe 5.27 4 4 5 5 4
Nassau 11.78 10 10 10 9 10
Niagara 2.18 2 2 2 3 2
Oneida 2.40 2 2 2 3 2
Onondaga 3.83 2 3 4 4 3
Suffolk 6.00 4 5 5 6 5
Westchester 7.22 5 6 6 6 6
Total 119.31 100 100 100 100 100
Computed from 1960 citizen-census data supplied by the United States Bureau of the
Census. See also N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, pp. 18-27 (1935).
APPENDIX A-2
CENSUS OF 1950
All counties Number Number of assembly seats under various formulae
having of Major
more than two constitu- fractions
constitutional tional Using second ratio frEqual
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 14.55 13 12 12 11 12
Kings 27.41 26 23 22 19 24
New York 18.96 17 16 16 14 16
Queens 15.67 14 13 13 12 13
Albany 2.47 2 2 2 4 2
Erie 9.28 7 8 8 8 8
Monroe 5.02 3 4 4 5 4
Nassau 6.92 5 6 6 6 6
Oneida 2.29 2 2 2 4 2
Onondaga 3.53 2 3 3 4 3
Suffolk 2.76 2 2 3 4 2
Westchester 6.35 4 6 6 6 5
Total 115.21 97 97 97 97 97
Computed from 1950 citizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 15 (1953).
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Cr-Nsus oF 1940
All counties Number of assembly seats under various formulae
havi~ng
more than two Number of Major Equal
constitutional constitutional Uing second ratio frac- propor-
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade tions tions
Bronx 15.01 13 13 13 12 13 13
]Kings 29.12 27 25 24 21 25 25
New York 19.55 is 17 16 14 17 16
Queens 14.56 13 12 12 11 12 12
Albany 2.58 2 2 3 4 2 2
Erie 9.25 7 3 3 8 S 3
Monroe 5.05 3 4 4 5 4 4
Nas-au 4.64 3 4 4 5 4 4
Oneida 2.35 2 2 2 4 2 2
Onondaga 3.42 2 3 3 4 3 3
Suffolk 2.21 2 2 2 3 2 2
Westchester 6.49 5 5 6 6 5 6
Total 114.23 97 97 97 97 97 97
Computed from 1940 dtizen-cenus data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 50-51
(1942).
APPED Imx A-4
CENSUS OF 1930
All counties Number of assembly seats under various formulae
having Major
more than two Number of fractions
constitutional constitutional Using second ratioEqual
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade prrportions
Bronx 14.40 13 12 12 11 12
Kings 29.13 27 24 24 21 25
New York 19.93 13 17 16 15 17
Queens 13.05 11 11 11 10 11
Albany 2.71 2 2 3 4 2
Erie 9.55 8 s S 8 S
Monroe 5.29 3 5 5 5 4
Nassau 3.69 2 3 3 4 3
Oneida 2.50 2 2 2 4 2
Onondaga 3.69 2 3 3 4 3
Westchester 6.27 4 5 5 6 5
Total 110.26 92 92 92 92 92
Computed from 1930 citizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 50-51
(1942).
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APPENDIX A-5
CENSUS OF 1925
All countieshAloig Number of assembly seats under various formulaehaving
more than two Number of Major Equal
constitutional constitutional Using second ratio frac- propor-
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade tions tons
Bronx 11.28 10 10 10 9 10 10
Kings 27.90 27 24 24 20 24 24
New York 22.61 21 20 19 17 20 19
Queens 10.01 9 9 9 9 9 9
Albany 2.89 2 3 3 4 3 3
Erie 9.89 8 9 8 9 9 9
Monroe 5.54 4 5 5 6 5 5
Nassau 2.87 2 2 3 4 2 3
Oneida 2.77 2 2 3 4 2 2
Onondaga 3.84 2 3 3 4 3 3
Westchester 5.87 5 5 5 6 S 5
Total 105.47 92 92 92 92 92 92
Computed from 1925 citizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 50-51
(1942).
APPENDLX A-6
CENSUS OF 1915
All counties Number of assembly seats under various formulae
having Major
more than two Number of fractions
constitutional constitutional Using second ratioa________________________or Equal
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 9.18 8 8 8 8 8
Kings 26.82 26 24 23 20 24
New York 27.40 26 24 23 20 24
Queens 6.53 5 6 6 6 6
Albany 3.15 2 3 3 4 3
Erie 9.44 8 8 8 8 8
Monroe 5.23 4 5 5 5 5
Oneida 2.69 2 2 3 4 2
Onondaga 3.62 2 3 3 4 3
Orange 2.01 2 2 2 3 2
Rensselaer 2.15 2 2 2 4 2
Westchester 5.08 4 4 5 5 4
Total 103.30 91 91 91 91 91
Computed from 1915 citizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 50-51
(1942).
APPORTIONMENT
APPENmDI A-7
C Nsus oF 1905
All counties Number of assembly seats under various formulae
having Number Major
more than two of fractions
constitutional constitutional Using second ratio or Equal
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Kings 25.03 24 23 23 20 23
New York 38.23 37 36 35 29 36
Queens 3.82 3 4 4 5 4
Albany 3.43 3 3 3 4 3
Erie 9.31 9 9 9 9 9
Monroe 4.79 4 4 5 5 4
Oneida 2.79 2 3 3 4 3
Onondaga 3.60 3 3 3 5 3
Orange 2.16 2 2 2 3 2
Rensselaer 2.52 2 2 2 4 2
Westchester 4.30 4 4 4 5 4
Total 10.03 93 93 93 93 93
Computed from 1905 citizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 50-51
(1942).
APpE:NDIX A-S
CENSUS OF 1S92
All counties Number of assembly seats under various formulae
having Number Major
more than two of fractions
constitutional constitutional Using second ratio or Equal
ratios ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Kings 22.51 22 21 21 17 21
New York 36.S9 36 35 34* 27 35
Queens 3.21 3 3 3 4 3
Albany 4.06 4 4 4 5 4
Erie 7.S9 7 3 S 7 S
Monroe 4.69 4 4 5* 5 4
Oneida 3.03 3 3 3 4 3
Onondaga 3.6S 3 4 4 5 4
Orange 2.42 2 2 2 4 2
Rensselaer 3.15 3 3 3 4 3
SL Lawrence 2.09 2 2 2 3 2
Steuben 2.11 2 2 2 3 2
Ulster 2.21 2 2 2 4 2
Westchester 3.35 3 3 3 4 3
Total 101.29 96 96 96 96 96
Computed from 1892 eitizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 0-51
(1942).
* The 1394 convention apportioned thirty-five assembly seats to New York and four to
Monroe.
1962]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
APPENDIX B-i
CENSUS OF 1960
All counties Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under various formulae
having Major
more than two fractions
constitutional or Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 124,382 124,382 136,821 136,821 124,382
Kings 119,929 125,926 132,553 157,407 125,926
New York 121,851 132,006 132,006 144,006 132,006
Queens 123,792 133,314 133,314 144,423 133,314
Richmond 108,382 108,382 108,382 72,255 108,382
Albany 134,544 134,544 134,544 67,272 134,544
Erie 129,956 129,956 129,956 129,956 129,956
Monroe 142,757 142,757 114,206 114,206 142,757
Nassau 127,580 127,580 127,580 141,756 127,580
Niagara 117,839 117,839 117,839 78,559 117,839
Oneida 129,665 129,665 129,665 86,443 129,665
Onondaga 207,385 138,257 103,693 103,693 138,257
Suffolk 162,528 130,022 130,022 108,352 130,022
Westchester 156,436 130,363 130,363 130,363 130,363
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 99,003 34,375 33,128 90,135 34,375
See Appendix A-1 supra.
APPENDIX B-2
CENSUS OF 1950
All counties Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under various formulae
having Major
more than two fractions
constitutional or Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 106,014 114,848 114,848 125,289 114,848
Kings 99,815 112,834 117,963 136,589 108,133
New York 105,631 112,233 112,233 128,266 112,233
Queens 106,015 114,170 114,170 123,685 114,170
Albany 117,034 117,034 117,034 58,517 117,034
Erie 125,500 109,813 109,813 109,813 109,813
Monroe 158,346 118,759 118,759 95,007 118,759
Nassau 131,138 109,282 109,282 109,282 109,282
Oneida 108,243 108,243 108,243 54,122 108,243
Onondaga 167,227 111,484 111,484 83,613 111,484
Suffolk 130,502 130,502 87,001 65,251 130,502
Westchester 150,421 100,280 100,280 100,280 120,336
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 67,412 30,222 31,758 82,467 22,369
See Appendix A-2 supra.
1962] APPORTIONMENT
APPF,mu B-3
CENsus OF 1940
All counties
having Number of citizen inhabitants pcr as.emblyman under various formulae
more than two
constitutional Major Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade fractions prop'rtons
Bronx 95,432 95,4S2 95,4S2 103,439 95,4S2 95,4s2
Kings S9,166 96,299 100,312 114,642 9G,299 96,:99
New York 89,777 95,053 100,999 115,427 95,oS 1c),()99
Queens 92,596 100,313 100,313 109,432 1C0,313 1C0,313
Albany 106,592 106,592 71,061 53,296 106,592 10go5,92
Erie 109,296 95,634 95,634 95,634 95,634 95,634
Monroe 139,173 104,3S4 104,384 S3,507 1C4,334 104,304
Nassau 127,755 95,817 95,S17 76,653 95,317 95,S17
Oneida 97,15S 97,153 97,1Ss 4s,579 97,153 97,15
Onondaga 141,464 94,309 94,309 70,732 94.3C9 94,3G9
Suffolk 91,432 91,432 91,432 09.955 91,432 91,432
Westchester 107,320 107,330 S9,483 S9,4S3 107,3-0 S9,4-3
Differene
between the
largest and
the smallest 52,293 15,94S 33,323 66,34S 15,94S 17,109
See Appendix A-3 supra.
APP.''-D= B-4
CExsus oF 1930
All counties Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under .arious formulae
having Major
more than two fractions
constitutional or Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 81,927 S3,754 83,754 96,322 3,754
Kings 79,911 89,9C0 S9,900 102,743 S6,304
New York 81,949 36,664 92,00 93,219 -G,(G64
Queens 87,696 37,696 87,696 96,466 87,196
Albany 100,357 100,357 66,905 50,179 10,357
Erie 33,303 SS,303 S8,303 S3V03 S3,303
Monroe 130,297 78,17S 73,173 73,178 97,723
Nassau 136,307 90,371 90,371 63,154 90,371
Oneida 92,293 92,293 92,293 46,147 92,293
Onondaga 136,291 90,361 90,861 63,146 90,E61
Westchester 115,833 92,666 92,666 77,222 92,666
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 56,396 22,179 25,761 56,596 14,053
See Appendix A-4 supra.
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APPENDIX B-5
CENSUS OF 1925
All counties
havinghang t Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under various formulaemore than two
constitutional Major Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade Fractions Proportions
Bronx
Kings
New York
Queens
72,698 72,698 72,698 80,776 72,698
66,606 74,931 74,931 89,918 74,931
69,385 72,855 76,689 85,711 72,855
71,669 71,669 71,669 71,669 71,669
Albany 93,123 62,082 62,082 46,561 62,082
Erie 79,667 70,815 79,667 70,815 70,815
Monroe 89,300 71,440 71,440 59,533 71,440
Nassau 92,545 92,545 61,696 46,272 92,545
Oneida 89,210 89,210 59,473 44,605 89,210
Onondaga 123,602 82,401 82,401 61,801 82,401
Westchester 75,675 75,675 75,675 63,063 75,675
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 56,996 27,128 22,928 45,313 30,463
72,698
74,931
76,689
71,669
62,082
70,815
71,440
61,696
89,210
82,401
75,675
27,514
See Appendix A-5 supra.
APPENDIX B-6
CENSUS oF 1915
All counties Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under various formulae
having Major
more than two fractions
constitutional or Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Bronx 61,642 61,642 61,642 61,642 61,642
Kings 55,432 60,051 62,662 72,061 60,051
New York 56,626 61,345 64,012 73,614 61,345
Queens 70,219 58,516 58,516 58,516 58,516
Albany 84,545 56,363 56,363 42,273 56,363
Erie 63,373 63,373 63,373 63,373 63,373
Monroe 70,219 56,175 56,175 56,175 56,175
Oneida 72,388 72,388 48,259 36,194 72,388
Onondaga 97,235 64,823 64,823 48,618 64,823
Orange 54,113 54,113 54,113 36,075 54,113
Rensselaer 57,788 57,788 57,788 28,894 57,788
Westchester 68,267 68,267 54,614 54,614 68,267
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 43,122 18,275 16,564 44,720 18,275
See Appendix A-6 supra.
1962] APPORTIONMENT
Ap'pma= B-7
CESUS OP 1905
All counties Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under various formulae
haxing Major
more than two fractions
constitutional or Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Kings 49,116 51,251 51,251 5,939 51"251
New York 4S,657 50,003 51,437 62,079 50, H3
Queens 59,915 44,937 44,937 35,949 44,937
Albany 54,661 54,661 54,661 40,996 54,661
Erie 43,731 43,731 4S,731 43,731 43,731
Monroe 56,402 56,402 45,122 45,122 56,402
Oneida 65,697 43,79S 43,79S 32,M3 43,793
Onondaga 56,577 56,577 56,577 33,946 56,577
Orange 50,322 50,S22 50,822 33,S31 50,822
Rensselaer 59,366 59,366 59,366 29,6S3 59366
Westchester 50,663 50,663 50,663 40,530 50,663
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 17,040 15,56S 15,563 32,396 15.563
See Appendix A-7 supra.
APPF"xDLm B-S
Crazsus or 1S92
Au counties Number of citizen inhabitants per assemblyman under various formulae
having Major
more than two fractions
constitutional or Equal
ratios Cullen Tuttle Brown McQuade proportions
Kings 39,499 41,330 41,3S0 51,117 41,380
New York 39,555 40,635 41,382 52,740 40,635
Queens 41,325 41,325 41,325 30,994 41,325
Albany 39,187 39,137 39,187 31,350 39,187
Erie 43,530 33,039 33,0S9 43,530 38,0s9
Monroe 45,303 45,303 36,246 36,246 45,303
Oneida 39,06S 39,063 39,063 29,301 39,0 63
Onondaga 47,353 35,515 35,515 23,412 35,51S
Orange 46,636 46,636 46,636 23,313 46,636
Rensselaer 40,560 40,560 40,560 30,420 40,SCO
St. Lawrence 40,340 40,340 40,340 26,S93 40,340
Steuben 40,700 40,700 40,700 27,133 40,760
Ulster 42,696 42,696 42,696 21,343 42,696
Westchester 43,075 43,075 43,075 32,306 43,07S
Difference
between the
largest and
the smallest 8,235 11,121 11,121 31,392 11,121
See Appendix A-8 supra.
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The assembly shall always consist of two hundred members. One assemblyman shall be
apportioned to every county, including Fulton and Hamilton as one county. The remaining
assemblymen shall be apportioned to the several counties, including Fulton and Hamilton
as one county, in the order of priority determined by the formula of major fractions. The
priority list shall be determined by dividing each county's total citizen population by time
arithmetic mean of the last seat apportioned to said county and the next seat to be np-
portioned to said county. No county shall hereafter be erected unless it shall contain at least
one-half of one per cent (1/200th) of the State's total citizen population. See note 170 supra.
C-1: According to citizen census of 1960 C-2: According to citizen census of 1950
Number of Number of
Num- citizen Num- citizen
ber inhabitants ber inhabitants
Rank County of seats per seat Rank County of seats per seat
Schuyler
Yates
Schoharie
Lewis
Greene
Putnam
Seneca
Orleans
Wyoming
Essex
Tioga
Cortland
Chenango
Delaware
Warren
Livingston
Allegany
Franklin
Sullivan
Columbia
Washington
Otsego
Genesee
Madison
Fulton &
Hamilton
Montgomery
Tompkins
Herkimer
Wayne
Ontario
Rensselaer
Clinton
Chautauqua
14,974
18,552
22,410
23,064
30,931
31,006
31,235
33,845
34,534
34,987
37,610
40,685
42,979
43,237
43,594
43,690
43,759
43,915
44,434
46,734
48,135
51,588
53,416
54,262
55,067
56,287
64,227
65,218
67,344
67,410
70,467
71,389
71,916
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Schuyler
Yates
Putnam
Lewis
Schoharie
Greene
Seneca
Orleans
Tioga
Wyoming
Essex
Cortland
Warren
Chenango
Sullivan
Livingston
Columbia
Allegany
Delaware
Franklin
Madison
Washington
Genesee
Otsego
Clinton
Fulton &
Hamilton
Wayne
Montgomery
Tompkins
Ontario
Herkimer
Rensselaer
Dutchess
14,066
17,461
19,668
22,187
22,218
28,082
28,254
29,306
29,826
32,275
34,542
36,786
38,677
38,741
39,359
39,692
42,111
43,475
43,863
43,919
45,624
46,353
46,690
50,089
52,443
54,190
56,662
57,610
57,853
59,269
59,693
64,998
65,985
APPORTIONMENT
APPEND=' C (Cont'd)
C-1: According to citizen ceusus of 1960 C-2: According to citizen census of 1950
Number of Number of
Num- citizen Num- citizen
ber inhabitants her inhabitants
Rank County of seats per seat Rank County ofseats per teat
34 Cayuga
35 Schenectady
36 Niagara
37 Cattaraugus
38 Onondaga
39 Oswego
40 Bronx
41 Dutchess
42 Oneida
43 Jefferson
44 Erie
45 Queens
46 Kings
47 Westchester
4S New York
49 Saratoga
50 Albany
51 Orange
52 Nassau
53 Suffolk
54 Monroe
55 Steuben
56 Chemung
57 Broome
53 Richmond
59 St. Lawrence
60 Ulster
61 Rockland
73,240
75,344
7S,559
79,543
82,954
85,356
S5,513
85,69S
36,443
S6,606
S6,637
86,654
86,845
86,909
SS,004
33,134
89,696
89,937
91,129
92,873
95,172
97,176
97,391
104,799
103,382
109,082
116,313
131,S34
34 Chautauqua
35 Cayuga
36 Schenectady
37 Oneida
33 Nassau
39 Erie
40 Saratoga
41 Orange
42 New York
43 Westchester
44 Oswego
45 Kings
46 Bronx
47 Cattaraugus
43 Albany
49 Queens
50 Monroe
51 Jefferson
52 Onondaga
53 Chemung
54 Rockland
55 Suffolk
56 Ulster
57 Broome
53 Steuben
59 Niagara
60 Richmond
61 St. Lawrence
66,53O
69,037
69,652
72,162
72,854
73i,9
73,447
74,215
74,S22
75,210
75,935
76,329
76 -5
76,9i93
73,023
73,117
79,173
33,339
S3,613
S6,123
37,01
90,350
90,743
90,761
92,031
92,516
96.517
Total 200 I Total 2C0
Range: 14,974-131,S34 Range: 14,066-96,517
Average: S1,204 Average: 71,017
Median: S6,654 Median: 75,935-76,329
Computed from 1960 citizen-census data Computed from 1950 citizcn-census data
supplied by the United States Bureau of published in N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 93, p. 14
the Census. (1953).
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The ratio for apportioning assemblymen shall always be determined by dividing the State's
total citizen population by two hundred. One assemblyman shall be apportioned to every
county, including Fulton and Hamilton as one county, below the ratio. Every other county,
including Fulton and Hamilton as one county, shall be apportioned one assemblyman for
each full ratio of citizen population and for every major fraction thereof. No county shall
hereafter be erected unless it shall contain at least one-half of one per cent (1/200th) of the
State's total citizen population. See note 170 supra.
D-1: According to citizen census of 1960 D-2: According to citizen census of 1950
Number of Number of
Num- citizen Num- citizen
ber inhabitants ber inhabitants
Rank County of seats per seat Rank County of seats per seat
1 Schuyler
2 Yates
3 Schoharie
4 Lewis
5 Greene
6 Putnam
7 Seneca
8 Orleans
9 Wyoming
10 Essex
11 Tioga
12 Cortland
13 Chenango
14 Delaware
15 Warren
16 Livingston
17 Allegany
18 Franklin
19 Sullivan
20 Columbia
21 Washington
22 Otsego
23 Genesee
24 Madison
25 Fulton &
Hamilton
26 Montgomery
27 Tompkins
28 Herkimer
29 Rockland
30 Wayne
31 Ontario
32 Broome
33 Rensselaer
34 Clinton
1 14,974
1 18,552
1 22,410
1 23,064
1 30,931
1 31,006
1 31,235
1 33,845
1 34,534
1 34,987
1 37,610
1 40,685
1 42,979
1 43,237
1 43,594
1 43,690
1 43,759
1 43,915
1 44,434
1 46,734
1 48,135
1 51,588
1 53,416
1 54,262
1 55,067
1 56,287
1 64,227
1 65,218
2 65,917
1 67,344
1 67,410
3 69,866
2 70,467
1 71,389
1 Schuyler
2 Yates
3 Putnam
4 Lewis
5 Schoharie
6 Greene
7 Seneca
8 Orleans
9 Tioga
10 Wyoming
11 Essex
12 Cortland
13 Warren
14 Chenango
15 Sullivan
16 Livingston
17 Columbia
18 Allegany
19 Delaware
20 Franklin
21 Madison
22 Washington
23 Genesee
24 Otsego
25 Clinton
26 Fulton &
Hamilton
27 Wayne
28 Montgomery
29 Tompkins
30 Ontario
31 Herkimer
32 Broome
33 Niagara
34 Richmond
1 14,066
1 17,461
1 19,668
1 22,187
1 22,218
1 28,082
1 28,254
1 29,306
1 29,826
1 32,275
1 34,542
1 36,786
1 38,677
1 38,741
1 39,359
1 39,692
1 42,111
1 43,475
1 43,863
1 43,919
1 45,624
1 46,353
1 46,690
1 50,089
1 52,443
1 54,190
1 56,662
1 57,610
1 57,853
1 59,269
1 59,693
3 60,499
3 61,387
3 61,677
APPORTIONMENT
AsPsa-mx D (Contd)
D-1: According to citizen census of 1960 D-2: According to citizen census of 1950
Number of Number of
Num- citizen Num- citizen
her inhabitants ber inhabitants
Rank County of seats per seat Rank County of seats per eat
Chautauqua
Richmond
Cayuga
Schenectady
'Westchester
NMagara
New York
Cattaraugus
Nassau
Erie
Bronx
Kings
Suffolk
Monroe
Queens
Onondaga
Oswego
Dutchess
Oneida
Jefferson
Saratoga
Albany
Orange
Steuben
Chemung
St. Lawrence
71,916
72,255
73,240
75,344
78,21S
73,559
79,203
79,54S
79,73S
79,973
SO,483
31,242
31,264
S1,576
S2,523
82,954
S5,356
S5,69S
86,443
36,606
33,134
S9,696
S9,937
97,176
97,891
109,032
11 6_Rl
35 Rensselaer
36 Suffolk
37 DutcheZs
33 Chautauqua
39 Onondaga
40 Monroe
41 Cauga
42 Schenectady
43 Kings
44 Queens
45 New York
46 Oneida
47 Bronx
43 Nassau
49 Erie
50 Saratoga
51 Orange
52 Westchuster
53 Oswego
54 Cattaraugus
55 Albany
56 Jefferson
57 Chemung
58 Rockland
59 Ulster
60 SteuLen
61 St. Lawrence
Total 215 Total 213
Range: 14,974-116,S18 Range: 14,066-96,517
Average: 75,539 Average: 66,633
Median: 79,973 Median: 70,140
Computed from 1960 citizen-census data Computed from 1950 citizen-ccnsus data
supplied by the United States Bureau of published in N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 931, p. 14
the Census. (1953).
2 64,993
4 65,251
2 65,935
2 C6,5s0
5 C6,391
7 67,e62
1 69,037
2 69,652
37 70,140
21 70,677
25 71,29
3 72,162
19 72,936
9 72, 54
12 73,269
1 73,447
2 74,215
S 75,210
1 75,935
1 76,993
3 78,023
1 S3,5.39
1 35,939
1 3t*,123
1 90,350
1 90,761
1 96,517Ulster 116813
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APPENDIX D (Cont'd)
PLAN TWO
D-3: Number of assemblymen apportioned under Plan Two on the basis of the census of:
1960
New York State 215
New York City 92
Bronx 17
Kings 31
New York 20
Queens 21
Richmond 3
Remainder of State 123
Albany 3
Allegany 1
Broome 3
Cattaraugus 1
Cayuga I
Chautauqua 2
Chemung 1
Chenango 1
Clinton 1
Columbia 1
Cortland 1
Delaware 1
Dutchess 2
Erie 13
Essex 1
Franklin 1
Fulton & Hamilton 1
Genesee 1
Greene 1
Herkimer 1
Jefferson 1
Lewis 1
Livingston 1
Madison 1
Monroe 7
Montgomery 1
Nassau 16
Niagara 3
Oneida 3
Onondaga 5
Ontario 1
Orange 2
Orleans 1
Oswego 1
Otsego 1
Putnam 1
Rensselaer 2
[Vol. 31
1930
210
105
19
39
27
17
3
105
4
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
13
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
5
2
3
5
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1925
206
98
15
37
30
13
3
108
4
1
3
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
4
5
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1962] APPORTIONMENT
APPz-Dnx D (Cont'd)
D-3: Number of assemblymen apportioned under Plan Twvo on the basis of the census of:
1960 1950 1940 1930 1925 1915 1905 1892
Rockland 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
St. Lawrence 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3
Saratoga 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Schenectady 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Schoharie 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Schuyler 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1
Seneca 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 1
Steuben 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
Suffolk S 4 3 3 3 2 2 2
Sullivan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tioga 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tompkins 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ulster 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
Warren 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Washington 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 2
Wayne 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Westchester 10 S 9 3 3 7 6 4
Wyoming 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Yates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Computed from citizen-census data published in N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57, pp. 50-51 (1942);
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 9S, p. 14 (1953); and 1960 citizen-census data supplicd by the Unitcd
States Bureau of the Census.
Axramzx'D E
TABLE or DIVISORS TO BE USED rOR COa!PUTn;G PrIOniTES
According to method of
For Equal Major
assem- proportions fractions
blyman Smallest Harmonic (geometric (arithmetic Greatest
number diisors mean* mean) mean) diviors
2 1 1.333 1.414 1.5 2
3 2 2.400 2.449 25 3
4 3 3.429 3.464 3.5 4
5 4 4.444 4.472 45 S
6 5 5.455 5.477 5.5 6
7 6 6.462 6.481 6.5 7
S 7 7.467 7.483 7.5 8
9 S S.471 8.S5 8.5 9
10 9 9.474 9.4S7 9.5 10
11 10 10.476 10.483 10.5 11
12 11 11.478 11AS9 11.5 12
13 12 12AS0 12.490 12.5 13
14 13 13.4S1 13.491 13.5 14
15 14 14.433 14.491 14.5 15
16 15 15A4 15.492 15.5 16
17 16 16.485 16.492 16.5 17
* Rounded-off at third decimal
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According to method of
For Equal Major
assem- proportions fractions
blyman Smallest Harmonic (geometric (arithmetic Greatest
number divisors mean* mean) * mean) divisors
18 17 17.486 17A93 17.5 18
19 18 18.486 18.493 18.5 19
20 19 19.487 19.494 19.5 20
21 20 20.488 20.494 20.5 21
22 21 21.488 21.494 21.5 22
23 22 22.489 22A94 22.5 23
24 23 23.489 23.495 23.5 24
25 24 24.490 24.495 24.5 25
26 25 25.490 25.495 25.5 26
27 26 26.491 26.495 26.5 27
28 27 27.491 27.495 27.5 28
29 28 28.491 28.496 28.5 29
30 29 29.492 29.496 29.5 30
31 30 30.492 30.496 30.5 31
32 31 31.492 31.496 31.5 32
33 32 32.492 32.496 32.5 33
34 33 33.493 33.496 33.5 34
35 34 34.493 34.496 34.5 35
36 35 35.493 35.496 35.5 36
37 36 36.493 36.497 36.5 37
38 37 37.493 37.497 37.5 38
39 38 38.494 38.497 38.5 39
40 39 39.494 39.497 39.5 40
41 40 40.494 40.497 40.5 41
42 41 41.494 41.497 41.5 42
43 42 42.494 42.497 42.5 43
44 43 43.494 43.497 43.5 44
45 44 44.494 44.497 44.5 45
46 45 45.495 45.497 45.5 46
47 46 46.495 46.497 46.5 47
48 47 47.495 47.497 47.5 48
49 48 48.495 48.497 48.5 49
50 49 49.495 49.497 49.5 50
51 50 50.495 50.497 50.5 51
99 98 98.497 98.498 98.5 99
100 99 99.497 99.499 99.5 100
101 100 100.498 100.499 100.5 101
149 148 148.498 148.499 148.5 149
150 149 149.498 149.499 149.5 150
151 150 150.498 150.499 150.5 151
199 198 198.499 198.499 198.5 199
200 199 199.499 199.499 199.5 200
201 200 200.499 200.499 200.5 201
* Rounded-off at third decimal
